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Article 
The Fragmentation of Standing  
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.* 
Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed the accelerated fragmentation of standing 
into a multitude of varied, complexly related subdoctrines.  Scarcely a Term 
goes by without the Supreme Court deciding one or more high-profile 
standing cases.1  Yet the Court’s decisions have done little to enhance 
 
 * Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful for 
comments by Tara Grove, Vicki Jackson, Dan Meltzer, and Adrian Vermeule, and by participants 
in a session of the Federal Courts Section of the American Association of Law Schools.  Niko 
Bowie, Caitlin Halpern, and Max Rosen provided extraordinary research assistance. 
1. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338, 2343 (2014) (finding 
that petitioners had standing to challenge an Ohio law criminalizing false statements made in 
connection with political campaigns based on a “credible threat” of enforcement); United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685–86 (2013) (upholding standing of the United States to seek 
review of a lower court decision mandating federal recognition of same-sex marriages licensed by 
states even though the United States agreed with the ruling on the merits); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662–63 (2013) (denying standing to private litigants who argued they were 
authorized by California law to defend a state ballot initiative barring gay marriage that state 
officials declined to defend); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147–50 (2013) 
(finding that various plaintiff organizations lacked standing to sue to enjoin national security 
wiretaps because their claims of injury rested on speculative fears and assumptions); Camreta v. 
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2029–30 (2011) (upholding standing of government officials who had 
prevailed in the lower court on grounds of official immunity to challenge the lower court’s ruling 
that their alleged conduct was nevertheless constitutionally prohibited); Ariz. Christian Sch. 
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011) (denying taxpayer standing to challenge 
allegedly unconstitutional tax credits to support religious institutions); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson 
Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 144, 156 (2010) (upholding standing in a dispute regarding whether a 
plant entity should be subject to government regulation); Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 705–06, 
712 (2010) (finding that, “[h]aving obtained a final judgment granting relief on his claims,” 
petitioner had standing to challenge a transfer of land by the government in a case involving a 
religious symbol); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493–95 (2009) (denying standing 
to an organization that failed to demonstrate governmental regulations threatened imminent and 
concrete harm to identifiable members’ interests); Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 
554 U.S. 269, 285–86 (2008) (holding that assignees had Article III standing to pursue the 
assignor’s claim for money owed); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 
592–93 (2007) (distinguishing an earlier case and denying taxpayer standing to challenge 
expenditures that benefited religious institutions because the expenditures were made by the 
federal executive branch out of general rather than special appropriations); Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (finding that the state had a “special position and interest” sufficient to 
justify Article III standing that private challengers apparently would not possess); 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006) (holding that “state taxpayers have no 
standing under Article III to challenge state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of their 
status as taxpayers”).  Although perhaps failing to achieve high profile status, the Court’s 2014 
decision in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 
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clarity in this contentious corner of constitutional law.  To be sure, the 
problem of standing’s fragmentation did not begin with the Roberts Court.  
Since the Court began in the 1970s to characterize standing as turning 
almost entirely on a single, transsubstantive, tripartite test—requiring 
showings of injury in fact, causation, and redressability2—commentators 
have complained about inconsistencies and anomalies in application.3  Over 
time, however, the grounds for objection and occasional befuddlement have 
grown, not diminished, as more controversial cases upholding standing 
have taken their places alongside more controversial decisions denying it. 
The fragmentation of standing—as I shall presently seek to describe 
it—has regrettable current consequences, involving complexity and 
confusion, but it also contains a latent potential for positive development.  
However opaque or inadequate the Supreme Court’s opinions, over time its 
cases have formed patterns.  As I shall explain in considerable detail, those 
patterns are complex, and the Court has often failed to describe—much less 
 
(2014), may have important implications for the future of prudential standing doctrine.  See infra 
notes 267and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
3. See, e.g., Lee A. Albert, Justiciability and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote 
Relationship, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1139, 1154 (1977) (“[G]eneralized articulations of injury 
isolated from the claim invite charges of inconsistency, selectivity, and ad hoc decisionmaking; 
judicial expressions of skepticism about the merits, predictably commonplace in such standing 
decisions, provide further support for such charges.”); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 
Term—Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59 (1982) 
(“[U]nder the current formula the decision whether to grant standing necessarily implicates the 
merits of the case to some degree.”); William A. Fletcher, Standing: Who Can Sue to Enforce a 
Legal Duty?, 65 ALA. L. REV. 277, 286–87 (2013) (arguing that recent environmental standing 
decisions “respond to the Court’s perception of political reality” and find standing for individuals 
and groups with “increasing political influence”); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional 
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1380 (1973) (“[T]he criteria [for standing] 
have become confused and trivialized.”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. 
REV. 68, 68–69 (1984) (“Observers, with just cause, regularly accuse the Supreme Court of 
applying standing principles in a fashion that is not only erratic, but also eminently frustrating in 
view of the supposed threshold nature of the standing inquiry.” (footnote omitted)); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1743 (1999) (“The doctrinal 
elements of standing are nearly worthless as a basis for predicting whether a judge will grant 
individuals with differing interests access to the courts.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Fortuity and the 
Article III “Case”: A Critique of Fletcher’s The Structure of Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 289, 290 
(2013) (complaining that during the era of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, “[s]cholars were far 
better at deconstructing standing doctrine than proposing workable solutions” and “[m]ost often, 
they accused” the Justices of “manipulating standing rules to achieve the conservative goal” of 
denying relief to certain types of plaintiffs); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea 
for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663 (1977) (“[T]he law of standing lacks a rational 
conceptual framework. . . .  Decisions on questions of standing are concealed decisions on the 
merits of the underlying constitutional claim.”); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and 
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1988) (“It is almost de rigueur for 
articles on standing to quote Professor Freund’s testimony to Congress that the concept of 
standing is ‘among the most amorphous in the entire domain of public law.’” (quoting Judicial 
Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
89th Cong. 498 (1966) (statement of Paul A. Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School))). 
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justify—them as such.  But there are patterns nonetheless.  Once identified, 
those patterns frequently exhibit an implicit normative logic that not only 
enables predictions, at least by legal experts, but also gives definition to the 
law that lower courts are obliged to apply.  Although it is increasingly 
bootless to seek general rules governing standing to sue in federal court—at 
least beyond the frequently empty standards of injury, causation, and 
redressability—we can often achieve a good deal of clarity if we ask which 
rules apply to particular plaintiffs seeking particular forms of relief under 
particular constitutional or statutory provisions.4   
Among my central ambitions in this Article is to describe both the 
negative or confusion-generating and the positive or pattern-reflecting 
aspects of the fragmentation of standing.  But my aims go beyond 
description.  Through its several parts, this Article also pursues analytical, 
diagnostic, and prescriptive goals.  It aims to enhance understanding of 
standing doctrine and the dynamics that have given it its present shape.  The 
Article also aspires to promote realistic doctrinal reform, tailored in 
recognition of the sometimes unyielding factors that have occasioned 
standing’s fragmentation. 
Part I provides relevant background.  It offers a brief sketch of the 
modern history of standing doctrine, emphasizing the conceptual unity that 
the Supreme Court promised in the 1970s when it promulgated the 
apparently simple, tripartite, transsubstantive formula that makes standing 
invariably depend on injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 
Part II—which develops the Article’s central descriptive theses—
traces the accelerating trend toward doctrinal fragmentation, especially in 
decisions of the Roberts Court.  On the one hand, Part II demonstrates the 
failure of the Court’s three-part formula to explain the results that it often 
reaches.  On the other hand, it identifies complex patterns in the Court’s 
decisions, albeit ones that the Court has not always identified as such.  In 
effect, Part II furnishes a re-mapping of the present law of standing. 
Part III advances the argument, which I expect to be uncontroversial, 
that the mixture of complexity and lack of articulate explanation that 
characterizes much of current standing doctrine is regrettable from all 
perspectives.  But Part III marks a step along the path of inquiry, not an 
ultimate pronouncement.  It lays the foundation for further diagnostic and 
prescriptive analysis. 
 
4. Cf. Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 174, 213 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court tends to relax standing 
requirements in cases in which Congress has conferred procedural rights and maintaining more 
generally that “the most plausible way to reconcile the Court’s inconsistent approaches to standing 
is to admit that . . . there are two tiers of the Case or Controversy Clause—one for procedural 
rights cases and one for traditional common law review”). 
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Part IV draws heavily on insights from the social sciences in 
identifying multiple and overlapping causes for standing’s increasing 
fragmentation.  Some of these causes, it suggests, need to be accepted as 
fixed points that practical reform proposals must acknowledge and 
accommodate if they aim to be effective in the short term.  Part V buttresses 
the findings of Part IV’s diagnostic project by framing and answering the 
question of what makes standing, in comparison with other doctrines in 
constitutional law, distinctively prone to unacknowledged and therefore 
inadequately justified complexity. 
Part VI articulates the modest agenda for reform to which prior Parts 
have pointed.  Its suggestions operate along two tracks.  Both the Supreme 
Court and legal scholars, Part VI argues, should embrace the fragmentation 
of standing law as a fact of life and, having done so, should attempt to 
identify how generally stated rules or principles apply differently in 
coherently distinguishable contexts.  Building on the analytical model 
implicit in Part II’s mapping of doctrinal categories, Part VI also 
emphasizes the value of critical perspectives and normative prescription 
within doctrinally Realist scholarship. 
I. A Brief Sketch of History 
To take the measure of standing’s recently increasing fragmentation 
requires only a cursory account of the doctrine’s contested emergence and 
evolution.  Through most of American legal history, standing doctrine as 
we know it today—as a doctrine regulating who is a proper party to invoke 
the jurisdiction of a federal court to assert a legal claim or defense, either at 
trial or on appeal—did not exist.5  Nevertheless, standing is not entirely a 
twentieth-century invention.  In earlier periods, other doctrines—apparently 
reflecting widely shared understandings of the separation of powers and the 
limited reach of judicial authority—governed rights to sue in federal court.6 
 
5. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 113–14, 
146–48 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (discussing the origins of modern 
standing doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” 
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168–97 (1992) (providing a detailed overview of the 
development of modern standing doctrine); Winter, supra note 3, at 1418–25 (tracing the history 
of the concept of “standing”). 
6. See, e.g., Anne Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004) (noting that although “early American courts did not use the 
term ‘standing’ much,” they “were well aware of the need for proper parties,” they “regularly 
designated some areas of litigation as being under public control and others as being under private 
control,” and “[w]ithin the area of private control . . . paid close attention to whether the correct 
private parties were before them”). 
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In crude outline, one set of nineteenth-century doctrines structured 
actions by public officials to enforce the rights of the public.7  Another set 
applied to actions by private litigants, including cases in which private 
plaintiffs sought protection against unlawful official action.8  The latter 
doctrines reflected what commentators have called a “private rights” or 
“dispute resolution” model,9 generally limiting judicial intervention to the 
kinds of disputes that the founding generation likely would have regarded 
as cases “of a Judiciary nature.”10  Within this model, the plaintiff typically 
alleged that the defendant had harmed an interest protected at common 
law.11  Then, when the defendant answered by claiming that the challenged 
action had occurred pursuant to legal authority, the plaintiff would reply 
that any purported authorization violated the Constitution.12  If so, the 
official would be liable on the same terms as any other tortfeasor.13 
During the twentieth century, the private rights model came under 
strain from several directions.  Contributing factors included the vast 
increase in governmental regulation, which created novel rights that many 
or even all members of the public shared; an expansion of constitutional 
rights to embrace liberty interests that had no analogues at common law, 
including those associated with voting and freedom from discrimination; 
and an emerging conception of rights as swords with which to make 
demands on the government, and not merely use as shields against coercive 
mistreatment.14  In response, the Supreme Court began to develop doctrines 
that it expressly denominated as involving standing to govern the eligibility 
of parties to seek judicial enforcement of constitutional or statutory 
guarantees. 
For current purposes, the signal developments in the law of standing 
occurred during the 1960s and 1970s.  First, the Court purported to 
distinguish the question of standing from the question of whether a plaintiff 
 
7. See id. at 712 (indicating the central concern addressed by standing rules that “control of 
public rights should remain in the hands of public officials and that individuals should be free 
from arbitrary enforcement at the hands of private actors”). 
8. See id. (“Contrary to the critics’ claims, however, the Supreme Court did see some standing 
issues as constitutional, expressing particular concerns about unwarranted judicial interference 
with the federal and state political branches.”). 
9. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 72–73 (describing the dispute resolution model); 
Monaghan, supra note 3, at 1365–68 (introducing the private rights model as one of two models 
of judicial competence). 
10. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
11. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 113–14; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1717, 1723–24 (1975). 
12. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 114. 
13. Id. 
14. See id. (describing various sources of strain on the concept of standing in the twentieth 
century). 
FALLON. TERI(DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:12 AM 
1066 Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:1061 
 
had a legal right to relief on the merits.  It did so most explicitly in 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,15 in 
which it denied that standing required a legal authorization to sue.16  
Standing, the Court said, depended entirely on whether the plaintiff had 
suffered an injury to an interest “within the zone of interests to be protected 
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”17  In 
doing so, the Court formulated the dependence of standing on injury as a 
demand for injury in fact.18   
Before the end of the 1970s, however, the Court’s development of 
standing doctrine took a more restrictive turn.19  Emphasizing the function 
of standing in limiting the judicial role within the separation of powers, the 
Court increasingly insisted that, in order to support standing, an injury must 
be concrete and particularized.20  It also began to recite a standing formula 
that linked the need for injury in fact to a demand that plaintiffs trace a line 
of causation between an alleged constitutional violation and the injury that 
they suffered.21  The Court’s three-part formula also separately required 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that a favorable judicial ruling would redress their 
injuries.22  
 
15. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
16. See id. at 153 (rejecting a “legal interest” test for standing on the ground that it “goes to 
the merits” and asserting that “[t]he question of standing is different”). 
17. Id. at 153.  Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1377, 1387 (2014), subsequently characterized the zone of interests question as “an issue that 
requires [a court] to determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a 
legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” 
18. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152 (“The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges 
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”). 
19. See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976) (explaining that a 
federal court that ignores the requirement that a plaintiff must have “some personal interest” in the 
suit “overstep[s] its assigned role in our system of adjudicating only actual cases and 
controversies”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege and show 
that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified 
members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”); United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179–80 (1974) (holding that “[t]he acceptance of new categories of 
judicially cognizable injury has not eliminated the basic principle that to invoke judicial power the 
claimant” must satisfy the “fundamental tests” of standing). 
20. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220–23 (1974) 
(emphasizing concrete injury as an “indispensable element of a dispute” that requires the plaintiff 
to have suffered a particular harm); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179–80 (demanding more than a 
generalized grievance to satisfy the standing requirement). 
21. See, e.g., Simon, 426 U.S. at 41–42 (“Art[icle] III still requires that a federal court act only 
to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury 
that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court.”); Linda R.S. v. 
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973) (requiring a nexus between the alleged injury and the 
claim to be adjudicated). 
22. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (positing that relief must be likely to 
follow from a favorable decision); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 128 (1983) (determining 
that standing turns in part upon whether the plaintiff’s injuries are likely to be redressed from a 
favorable ruling); Simon, 426 U.S. at 38 (asserting that to establish a personal stake in the outcome 
FALLON.TERI(DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:12 AM 
2015] The Fragmentation of Standing 1067 
 
Since the 1970s, the Court has recited its tripartite demand for injury in 
fact, causation, and redressability with mind-numbing regularity, as if all, or 
nearly all, of standing doctrine could be divided into just three parts.23  The 
injury-in-fact prong of the test, devised to capture a prelegal conception of 
injury that did not vary with the merits of a plaintiff’s claim,24 bespeaks an 
especially strong aspiration to conceptual unity.25  In point of fact, 
conceptual unity never existed.  In framing the now familiar three-part test, 
the Burger Court sought not merely to describe then-existing law but also to 
rein in expansions of judicial power to oversee the operations of other 
branches of government that a majority of the Justices found disturbing.26  
According to Justice Lewis Powell, who was a leader in the drive to 
establish limits on standing, an important function of standing doctrine was 
to remove the judiciary from “amorphous general supervision of the 
operations of government.”27  In Justice Powell’s formulation, the courts 
properly protect “the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens 
and minority groups” who suffer concrete harms from government action 
but should otherwise avoid “essentially head-on confrontations” with “the 
representative branches of government” about the wisdom and even the 
constitutionality of government policies.28 
Given their aims, the Justices who initially propounded the three-part 
standing formula must have known that a number of cases that they 
apparently did not intend to overrule did not fit comfortably within the 
conceptual bounds that they laid out.  For example, they made little effort to 
explain why the complaints of voters in one-person, one-vote cases did not 
constitute “generalized grievance[s]” that were too widely shared to support 
standing,29 why municipal taxpayers suffered sufficient injury to have 
 
of a case, a plaintiff must be able to show an injury that is “likely to be redressed by a favorable 
[judicial] decision”). 
23. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011) 
(explaining that establishing standing requires an injury in fact, a causal link between the injury 
and the action complained of, and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (same); Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (same). 
24. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1432, 1448 (1988) (noting that “the injury-in-fact test . . . suggested that there was a prelegal 
category of injuries”). 
25. For an argument that the aspiration to unity is especially problematic insofar as the Court 
has demanded injury in fact in cases alleging violations of private rights, see generally F. Andrew 
Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275 (2008). 
26. Id. at 296–97. 
27. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).  On the 
role of Justice Powell in restricting standing doctrine, see generally Elizabeth Magill, Standing for 
the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1151 (2009). 
28. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 188, 192. 
29. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964) (implicitly conferring standing to 
similar voters in Alabama), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204–06 (1962) (upholding standing 
of plaintiff voters on behalf of all similarly situated qualified voters in Tennessee), with 
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standing to sue30 but federal taxpayers did not31 (except in a subset of 
Establishment Clause cases),32 or why and when various governmental 
officials could sue in their official capacities even when they had suffered 
no personal hardship.33  But if a conceptually unified standing doctrine 
always represented more of an aspiration than a reality, the Court of the 
1970s plainly regarded that aspiration as one that it both could and should 
realize more fully.   
II. Standing Under the Roberts Court 
In reflecting on the implicit promise of the Supreme Court to subsume 
all standing analysis under a single, tripartite, transsubstantive formula, one 
might well begin with Robert Burns’s much quoted observation that “[t]he 
best laid schemes o’ Mice an’ Men /Gang aft agley”34 and, from there, trace 
the development of standing doctrine from the 1970s through the present 
day as an illustration of that theme.  For reasons that will shortly become 
apparent, the project of creating a unitary and principled doctrinal structure 
built around the concepts of injury in fact, causation, and redressability was 
doomed from the beginning.  Here, however, I shall focus nearly 
exclusively on the handiwork of the Roberts Court.  For those who expected 
the Chief Justice’s concern with issues of judicial role and his commitment 
to high standards of judicial craftsmanship to lead to a more principled 
integration of standing doctrine, the record of the Roberts Court has 
occasioned considerable disappointment. 
Far from becoming more elegant and unified, standing doctrine has 
grown more complex and variegated with nearly every recent Supreme 
Court Term.  Part of the complexity arises from the failure of the Court’s 
continuing project of divorcing determinations of injury in fact from 
substantive judgments concerning the protections that particular provisions 
 
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176, 179–80 (withholding standing from an individual taxpayer with a 
generalized grievance about CIA expenditures). 
30. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947) (permitting appellant to bring suit 
in state court “in his capacity as a district taxpayer”). 
31. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 (denying respondent standing to bring complaint in 
federal court when standing was based on his status as a taxpayer); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 
U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (characterizing a single taxpayer’s “interest in the moneys of the Treasury” 
as “minute and indeterminable” and therefore not a basis for standing). 
32. E.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968).  For discussion of Flast, see infra notes 
45–61 and accompanying text. 
33. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437 (1939) (determining members of a state 
legislature had standing to bring suit to determine whether a Lieutenant Governor had authority to 
cast the deciding vote on a resolution); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236–37 
(1907) (permitting the State to bring suit in its capacity as “quasi-sovereign” to protect the State’s 
forests and air). 
34. ROBERT BURNS, To a Mouse, in POEMS CHIEFLY IN THE SCOTTISH DIALECT 138, 140 
(Woodstock Books 1991) (1786). 
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of law confer.35  Additional sources include the myriad of issues that 
emerge when governments and their officials, as distinguished from private 
plaintiffs, bring suits or otherwise seek legal redress.36  Nor is this the end.  
The Roberts Court has also struggled with issues involving congressional 
authority to confer standing and, separately, with the conundrums presented 
by relative probability and uncertainty concerning future action and the 
harms that it might cause.37  The Court has failed to develop a unitary 
formula for determining how likely it must be that a threat will ripen into a 
more palpable injury, or that a judicial ruling would redress an injury or 
threat thereof, in order for a plaintiff to have standing.38 
In saying that standing doctrine has grown progressively more 
fragmented, I should be clear about the nature of my claim.  My thesis is 
not the familiar, reductionist one that the secret to understanding the 
Supreme Court’s standing cases lies more in politics or ideology than in law 
and that the Justices recurrently manipulate standing doctrine to promote an 
ideological or political agenda through illicit means.39  To the contrary, 
while acknowledging that judicial ideology influences standing 
determinations in some cases in sometimes unavoidable ways, I shall 
assume throughout that standing doctrine is worth taking seriously.  In 
taking doctrine seriously, however, I shall train my attention as much on 
what the Court does as on what it says.  When I believe that the Court’s 
proffered explanations for particular outcomes are misleading or 
uninformative, I shall sometimes advance better, more persuasive, and more 
accurately descriptive grounds for distinctions that the Court recurrently 
draws.  My guiding assumption is that it is the obligation of lower courts 
and an important function of scholars to develop interpretations of Supreme 
Court precedents that furnish coherent guidance for deciding future cases as 
a matter of law.  Consistent with this assumption, my thesis holds that the 
Court’s standing decisions form discernible patterns and are often capable 
 
35. See infra subpart II(A). 
36. See infra subpart II(B). 
37. See infra subpart II(C). 
38. See infra subpart II(D). 
39. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 
B.U. L. REV. 301, 326 (2002) (“[M]uch of the rationale for access to the courthouse likely lies in 
ideology.”); Pierce, supra note 3, at 1743 (proclaiming that the votes of Supreme Court Justices 
on cases involving standing have been predictable and clearly split along ideological lines); Mark 
C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing to Challenge Faith-Based Spending, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1009, 1015–16 (2011) (“[I]nconsistency [in standing doctrine] leads to 
suspicion that decisions on standing in close cases may be guided more by the courts’ instincts 
toward the merits than by an independent determination of the parties’ eligibility to invoke 
jurisdiction.”); Christian B. Sundquist, The First Principles of Standing: Privilege, System 
Justification, and the Predictable Incoherence of Article III, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 119, 121 
(2011) (“[T]he inherent indeterminacy of standing law can be understood as reflecting an unstated 
desire to protect racial and class privilege, which is accomplished through the dogma of 
individualism, equal opportunity (liberty), and ‘white innocence.’”). 
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of determining doctrinally correct answers to future standing cases—but 
that the lines that need to be drawn to portray standing doctrine as ordered 
rather than disordered have grown increasingly numerous and complex over 
time.  By “fragmentation,” I mean the division of standing law into multiple 
compartments, most of which may be intelligible in themselves, but that 
reflect more conceptual and normative diversity than unity. 
In proceeding as I do, I draw inspiration from a strand of Realist legal 
scholarship that I shall describe as “doctrinal Realism.”40  This variety of 
Realism emphasizes a “distinction between the forms of words that judges 
use in laying down and describing legal doctrine and the kinds of facts that 
actually drive judicial decisions” in practice.41  Realists in this tradition 
maintain that the law, if rightly understood, typically makes sense in its 
own terms, but they insist that one should not be mesmerized by the bare 
words of judicial opinions, abstracted from the facts that evoked them.42 
A. Standing and the Merits 
In a brilliant article published in 1988, then-Professor William Fletcher 
argued that the question of whether a plaintiff has standing is conceptually 
inseparable from the question of whether a plaintiff has a right to sue to 
enforce the duties that a particular statutory or constitutional provision 
imposes.43  Since then, experience has taught that the concept of injury is 
 
40. For elaboration of this notion, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Make Sense of 
Supreme Court Standing Cases—A Plea for the Right Kind of Realism, 23 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 105 (2014). 
41. Id. at 106. 
42. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. 
REV. 431, 447 (1930) (arguing that there are “real ‘rules’ and rights” distinct from “paper rules 
and rights”); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1223 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism] 
(discussing Realists who seek to discern the “tangibles which can be got at beneath the words”); 
Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 159 (1928) (“Not the judges’ 
opinions, but which way they decide cases will be the dominant subject matter of any truly 
scientific study of law.”); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 
(1910) (noting distinctions “between the rules that purport to govern the relations of man and man 
and those that in fact govern them”). 
43. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).  Fletcher wrote: 
If a duty is statutory, Congress should have essentially unlimited power to define the 
class of persons entitled to enforce that duty, for congressional power to create the 
duty should include the power to define those who have standing to enforce it.  If a 
duty is constitutional, the constitutional clause should be seen not only as the source 
of the duty, but also as the primary description of those entitled to enforce it.  
Congress should have some, but not unlimited, power to grant standing to enforce 
constitutional rights.  The nature and extent of that power should vary depending on 
the duty and constitutional clause in question. 
Id. at 223–24.  For an earlier development of similar insights, see generally Lee A. Albert, 
Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 
YALE L.J. 425 (1974). 
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too vague and malleable for the idea of injury in fact to have much 
analytical bite in many cases.  Try as the Supreme Court might to 
conceptualize standing injury as injury in fact, its decisions reveal that 
whether a plaintiff has suffered a judicially cognizable injury—and, if so, 
whether the relief sought is sufficiently likely to redress it to support 
standing—frequently turns on the provision of law under which a plaintiff 
seeks relief.  As a result, a body of doctrine that aspires to trans-
substantivity instead fractures along substantive lines in important, 
identifiable categories of cases. 
 1. The Establishment Clause.—The fragmentation of standing doctrine 
nowhere manifests itself more visibly than in suits to enforce the 
Establishment Clause.  For practical purposes, one rule upholds the 
standing of taxpayers seeking to enjoin direct congressional expenditures in 
support of religion; a second denies standing to taxpayers who object to the 
use of general appropriations and the provision of tax credits to support 
religion; and a third governs challenges to public displays of religious 
objects.  
To understand the current state of the law, one must recognize that the 
Roberts Court inherited a seemingly anomalous doctrine of taxpayer 
standing to enforce the Establishment Clause.  Ordinarily, the Court has 
held, any purported injury that state or federal taxpayers suffer when the 
government spends tax dollars illegally or even unconstitutionally is too 
small, uncertain, or generalized to support standing.44  But in 1968, in Flast 
v. Cohen,45 the Warren Court made an exception for Establishment Clause 
cases.46  Apparently conscious of the novelty of its ruling, and perhaps 
intending its recognition of taxpayer standing as an experiment, the Flast 
Court predicated taxpayer standing on the satisfaction of a “double nexus” 
test: 
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status 
and the type of legislative enactment attacked. . . .  Secondly, the 
taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise 
nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.47 
On the facts before it, the Flast Court found the first requirement to be 
met by the link between taxpayer status and exercises by Congress of the 
taxing and spending power.48  The second nexus existed between taxpayer 
 
44. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347–49 (2006) (acknowledging 
the existence of a “general prohibition on taxpayer standing”). 
45. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
46. Id. at 105–06. 
47. Id. at 102. 
48. Id. at 103. 
FALLON. TERI(DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:12 AM 
1072 Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:1061 
 
status and the Establishment Clause.49  According to the Court, that 
provision addressed a concern among the founding generation that “the 
taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over 
another or to support religion in general.”50 
By a series of divided votes, the Roberts Court has maintained the 
Flast exception to the general rule that pocketbook injuries to federal 
taxpayers are too small, generalized, and uncertain to support standing, but 
it has narrowed that exception nearly to its facts.  In Hein v. Freedom from 
Religion Foundation, Inc.,51 which arose from efforts by the Executive 
Branch to ensure that faith-based community groups were not excluded 
from federal expenditure programs,52 Justice Alito sought to distinguish 
Flast on the tenuous ground that the money involved in the case before the 
Court came from a general appropriation for the Executive Branch, not a 
special enactment to support an establishment of religion.53  Concurring in 
the judgment, two Justices would have overruled Flast.54  According to 
Justice Scalia, a principled application of the injury-in-fact requirement 
required what he characterized as a “Wallet Injury.”55  In his view, the 
plaintiff had alleged only a “Psychic Injury,” which he thought could not 
suffice.56  Four other Justices called for what they regarded as a fair 
application of Flast: if the expenditure in Flast injured objecting taxpayers, 
then so did the outlay of federal money in Hein.57  The doctrinal line that 
emerges from Hein is serviceably clear.  Taxpayers have standing to 
challenge special appropriations to support religious institutions but not 
payments to support religion that the government makes out of generally 
available revenues.  Yet six Justices agree that this distinction makes no 
principled sense—a position with which I agree. 
Again purporting to distinguish Flast, the Court still further limited its 
precedential reach in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. 
Winn.58  In that case, a 5–4 majority, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held 
that support for religious education effected through tax credits, as 
distinguished from direct expenditures, did not injure the challengers in 
their capacity as taxpayers.59  In my view, the Court’s distinction between 
tax levies, which inflict injury, and tax credits, which do not, borders on the 
 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. 551 U.S. 587 (2007). 
52. Id. at 593–94 (plurality opinion). 
53. Id. at 605. 
54. Id. at 618, 635–37 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
55. Id. at 619–20. 
56. Id. at 619, 633. 
57. Id. at 637, 639 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
58. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
59. Id. at 1439, 1447–49. 
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logically unsupportable.  As Justice Kagan pointed out in dissent, it is 
nearly impossible to think that the mechanism by which the government 
provides financial support to religious education should matter to whether 
an aggrieved taxpayer can assert an Establishment Clause violation: 
Suppose a State desires to reward Jews—by, say, $500 per year—for 
their religious devotion.  Should the nature of taxpayers’ concern 
vary if the State allows Jews to claim the aid on their tax returns, in 
lieu of receiving an annual stipend?60 
Although Justice Kagan’s question seems to me to permit only a 
negative answer,61 what matters most for present purposes is the 
fragmentation within standing doctrine that the Roberts Court’s attempts at 
line drawing have produced.  We have one rule for taxpayer standing to 
enforce the Establishment Clause in Flast and cases that are nearly factually 
identical to it; another applies to cases in which challengers rely on their 
status as taxpayers to sue to stop government support of religious 
institutions effected through general appropriations and tax credits.   
Even more puzzling, we apparently also have another set of rules to 
govern standing in Establishment Clause cases in which aggrieved parties 
forgo reliance on taxpayer status when challenging government support for 
religion through, for example, displays of crèches and the Ten 
Commandments and officially sponsored prayers during sessions of 
governmental bodies.  In the latter category of cases, the Court has 
historically treated standing as largely unproblematic.  More specifically, it 
proceeded directly to the merits, without pausing to conduct a standing 
inquiry, in Lynch v. Donnelly62 and County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter,63 both of which involved crèches on public property;64 
in the Ten Commandments cases of Van Orden v. Perry65 and McCreary 
County v. ACLU of Kentucky;66 in Capitol Square Review & Advisory 
 
60. Id. at 1457 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
61. For the majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned: 
[T]ax credits and governmental expenditures do not both implicate individual 
taxpayers in sectarian activities.  A dissenter whose tax dollars are “extracted and 
spent” knows that he has in some small measure been made to contribute to an 
establishment in violation of conscience. . . .  When the government declines to 
impose a tax, by contrast, there is no such connection between dissenting taxpayer 
and alleged establishment. . . .  And awarding some citizens a tax credit allows other 
citizens to retain control over their own funds in accordance with their own 
consciences. 
Id. at 1447 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).  For an unsparing critique of Winn, 
see generally William P. Marshall & Gene R. Nichol, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing Standing 
and the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215. 
62. 465 U.S. 668, 672–73 (1984). 
63. 492 U.S. 573, 589–94 (1989). 
64. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670–71. 
65. 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
66. 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005). 
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Board v. Pinette,67 in which the Ku Klux Klan was permitted to maintain a 
Latin cross on the Ohio Statehouse grounds;68 and, most recently, in Town 
of Greece v. Galloway,69 in which aggrieved citizens challenged the Town’s 
practice of commencing meetings of its governing board with religious 
invocations by invited clergy.70   
To my mind, it is not obvious how to conceptualize the injury that an 
aggrieved citizen suffers in cases such as these.71  Nor is it obvious why the 
injury that a complainant experiences in that kind of case, however 
conceptualized, does not also exist when a plaintiff sues to stop 
governmental expenditures of money or provision of tax credits to support 
religious education. 
Questions such as these received extensive briefing in Salazar v. 
Buono,72 which originated as a challenge to the maintenance on federal land 
of a Latin cross erected by the Veterans of Foreign Wars as a tribute to 
fallen soldiers.73  But the case came before the Roberts Court in a compli-
cated procedural posture.  In earlier stages of the litigation, Buono had 
obtained a lower court injunction requiring removal of the cross, and the 
lower court’s judgment, which included a determination that Buono had 
standing to sue, became final when the government failed to appeal.74  By 
the time the dispute reached the Supreme Court, the government, pursuant 
to an Act of Congress, had transferred the property on which the cross stood 
to private ownership in exchange for another parcel of land.75  When Buono 
challenged that transfer, which left the cross in place, the government 
argued that he lacked standing because he had suffered no injury personal to 
him.76  
Despite the importance of the question whether Buono or anyone else 
would have standing to challenge an initial display of a cross on public 
 
67. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
68. Id. at 758, 770.  For a review of the standing analysis, or lack thereof, in these cases, see 
generally Ashley C. Robson, Measuring a “Spiritual Stake”: How to Determine Injury-in-Fact in 
Challenges to Public Displays of Religion, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2901, 2925–28 (2013). 
69. 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1818 (2014). 
70. Id. at 1816–17. 
71. The lower courts are divided about the standards that plaintiffs must satisfy to have 
standing to challenge such displays.  See Robson, supra note 67, at 2932–36 (contrasting a “direct 
and unwelcome contact” standard employed by the Eight Circuit with an “altered behavior” 
standard used by the Seventh Circuit).  Some have held that direct and unwelcome contact with a 
religious display constitutes an actionable injury.  E.g., Red River Freethinkers v. City of Fargo, 
679 F.3d 1015, 1024 (8th Cir. 2012); ACLU of Ohio Found. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424, 429–30 
(6th Cir. 2011).  The Seventh Circuit demands a showing of altered behavior.  Freedom from 
Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1468 (7th Cir. 1988). 
72. 559 U.S. 700 (2010). 
73. Id. at 706–07 (plurality opinion). 
74. Id. at 708–09. 
75. Id. at 709–10. 
76. Id. at 711. 
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property—or, presumably, the initial display of crèches or reproductions of 
the Ten Commandments—a splintered Court avoided it.  Instead, the 
plurality and principal dissenting opinions agreed that after the judgment 
granting Buono an injunction became final, he had standing to enforce it.77  
Justices Scalia and Thomas would have denied standing, but they, too, 
avoided the largest question.78  “[E]ven assuming that being ‘deeply 
offended’ by a religious display (and taking steps to avoid seeing it) 
constitutes a cognizable injury,” Justice Scalia wrote with evident 
skepticism, “Buono has made clear that he will not be offended.”79 
With a divided Roberts Court having avoided the most fundamental 
questions about standing to challenge public religious displays in Salazar, 
there can be no doubt that the doctrine governing standing to sue under the 
Establishment Clause is fragmented.  Nor can there be reasonable doubt 
that the doctrine currently draws distinctions, whether stable or unstable, 
that are very difficult to rationalize. 
2. The Equal Protection Clause.—Whatever Justice Scalia may 
believe to be the correct rule under the Establishment Clause, the Supreme 
Court does not always demand a redressable “Wallet Injury”80 to ground 
standing—nor does Justice Scalia think that it ought to do so—under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  The most instructive case predates the Roberts 
Court, but it establishes a precedent to which the Roberts Court would 
surely adhere.  In Heckler v. Mathews,81 Congress had provided higher 
social security benefits for some retired women than for men who had 
similar patterns of earnings.82  A statutory severability clause mandated that 
if a court found that the differential violated equal protection principles, 
affected women would receive the amount paid to men.83  Accordingly, the 
men who sued to challenge the disparity could not achieve a financial 
benefit.84  In Justice Scalia’s terms, they suffered no wallet injury.  
Nevertheless, the Court upheld standing.85  The plaintiffs’ injury, it 
reasoned, consisted not in the simple deprivation of benefits but in the 
deprivation of a right to have benefits “distributed according to clas-
sifications which do not without sufficient justification differentiate 
 
77. Id. at 711–12; id. 738 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
78. Id. at 729–30 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
79. Id. at 733. 
80. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
81. 465 U.S. 728 (1984). 
82. Id. at 731. 
83. Id. at 734. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 738. 
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. . . solely on the basis of sex.”86  The Court continued: “[D]iscrimination 
itself, by perpetuating ‘archaic and stereotypic notions’ or by stigmatizing 
members of the disfavored group as ‘innately inferior’ . . . can cause serious 
noneconomic injuries” that are cognizable and provide a basis for standing 
under the Equal Protection Clause.87  
The Court has upheld standing under reasoning that similarly ties 
judicially cognizable injury to the substantive guarantees of the Equal 
Protection Clause in cases challenging affirmative action programs.  Indeed, 
the Roberts Court did so by implication in Fisher v. University of Texas at 
Austin,88 in which it recited that the plaintiff was a Caucasian who had 
applied to an institution with a race-based affirmative action policy but 
made no express mention of standing issues at all.89  A standing question 
had arisen in the earlier case of Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke.90  Emphasizing the requirements of standing doctrine that a plaintiff 
show both an injury and a high probability that a favorable decision would 
redress that injury, amici argued that even if the Court held a challenged 
affirmative action program unconstitutional, the plaintiff Alan Bakke still 
might not gain admission to the University of California at Davis Medical 
School.91  But the Court held that Bakke suffered redressable injury from 
the university’s denial to him of the opportunity to compete for every slot in 
its entering class.92  A subsequent case made the Court’s rationale even 
more explicit: “The ‘injury in fact’ in an equal protection case of this 
variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of 
[a barrier that makes it more difficult for the members of a group to obtain a 
benefit], not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”93 
Although this reasoning seems correct to me, it clearly depends on the 
substantive guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause and, accordingly, 
requires distinctions within standing doctrine between cases in which the 
imposition of a barrier to receiving a benefit will, and those in which it will 
not, support standing.  To cite just one recent example, in Summers v. Earth 
Island Institute, Inc.,94 the Roberts Court held that members of an 
environmental organization lacked standing to challenge Forest Service 
regulations that imposed an obstacle to their achieving environmental 
 
86. Id. at 737 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 647 (1975)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
87. Id. at 739 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)). 
88. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
89. Id. at 2415, 2417. 
90. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
91. Id. at 280 n.14 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
92. Id. at 281 n.14. 
93. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 666 (1993). 
94. 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
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outcomes that they sought.95  According to the Court, the Forest Service’s 
challenged policies at most imposed a generalized injury that was 
insufficiently concrete and personalized to support standing.96 
3. National Security Policies.—The Roberts Court’s recent decision in 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA97 suggests that the requirements of 
standing may vary, not just with the provision of the Constitution under 
which a plaintiff brings suit, but also with the nature of the governmental 
action or policy that a plaintiff seeks to challenge.  The plaintiffs in Clapper 
were U.S. citizens residing in the United States who sought judicial 
invalidation of an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.98  The amendment permitted the Attorney General and Director of 
National Intelligence, with the authorization of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, to direct the interception of communications involving 
non-Americans “reasonably believed to be located outside the United States 
[in order] to acquire foreign intelligence information.”99  The plaintiffs 
alleged that their personal and professional relationships with parties abroad 
made it likely that their communications would be intercepted under the 
revised statute.100  Writing for the Court, Justice Alito denied standing 
based on the plaintiffs’ failure to establish that an injury in fact was 
“certainly impending” in light, among other things, of the opacity of the 
Government’s criteria for seeking foreign-security wiretaps.101  He 
concluded, in addition, that the plaintiffs had not adequately established that 
any injury they might suffer was or would be causally traceable to the 
challenged amendment since “[t]he Government has numerous other 
methods of conducting surveillance, none of which is challenged here.”102  
As four dissenting Justices pointed out, although some of the Court’s 
past decisions had referred to a need for “certainly impending” injury, 
future injury is seldom “absolutely certain,” and the “federal courts 
frequently entertain actions for injunctions and for declaratory relief aimed 
at preventing future activities that are reasonably likely or highly 
likely . . . to take place.”103  Because the plaintiffs had averred that their 
 
95. Id. at 493–97. 
96. Id. at 496–97. 
97. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
98. Id. at 1142. 
99. Id. at 1144 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2006 & Supp. V 2011)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The amendment required minimization procedures to restrict the collection of 
information about persons within the United States.  Id. at 1145. 
100. Id. at 1145, 1147. 
101. Id. at 1143 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
102. Id. at 1149. 
103. Id. at 1155, 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
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work as lawyers, scholars, and journalists required them to communicate 
with people abroad whom the government believed to be affiliated with 
terrorist groups, the dissenters thought the likelihood of injury large enough 
to permit standing.104 
With the majority and dissenting opinions citing different cases to 
support their judgments about the appropriate standard—and with even the 
majority acknowledging in a footnote (which I shall further discuss below) 
that “[o]ur cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is 
literally certain that the harms they identify will come about”105—an 
additional distinction that Justice Alito cited in his majority opinion takes 
on enhanced significance: “[W]e have often found a lack of standing in 
cases in which the Judiciary has been requested to review actions of the 
political branches in the fields of intelligence gathering and foreign 
affairs.”106 
In light of the supporting authority that the Court cited,107 among other 
cases, that assertion seems to me to be unquestionably true.  If I am right 
that it is also material to the Court’s holding, Clapper illustrates another 
line of fragmentation within the Roberts Court’s standing doctrine108 by 
making national security concerns relevant to standing inquiries.109  
Corroborating evidence for this hypothesis comes from the Court’s 2014 
decision in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,110 which upheld the standing 
of two advocacy groups to seek an injunction against enforcement of a 
statute alleged to violate the First Amendment by forbidding knowingly 
false statements about political candidates.111  Anticipating the possibility of 
enforcement actions in future campaigns, the Court unanimously ruled that 
 
104. Id. at 1157–60. 
105. Id. at 1150 n.5.  The majority went on to say that it had sometimes “found standing based 
on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”  Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed 
Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153 (2010)).  The footnote then continued: “[T]o the extent that the 
‘substantial risk’ standard is relevant and is distinct from the ‘clearly impending’ requirement, 
respondents fall short of even that standard, in light of the attenuated chain of inferences necessary 
to find harm here.”  Id. 
106. Id. at 1147. 
107. Id. (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209–11 
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167–70 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 
11–16 (1972)). 
108. For a pre-Clapper argument that lower court decisions have created confusion and 
incoherence by imposing a more restrictive standing standard for plaintiffs in surveillance cases 
than for other plaintiffs asserting probabilistic injuries, see generally Scott Michelman, Who Can 
Sue over Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 71 (2009). 
109. See also Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 
1297–98 (2013) (suggesting that, based on language in the Court’s opinion, “were a case with 
similar probabilities to arise outside the context of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs, and 
where the behavior of an independent decisionmaker were not implicated, there might in fact be 
standing”). 
110. 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014). 
111. Id. at 2338–40, 2243. 
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“a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges ‘an 
intention to engage in . . . conduct arguably affected with a constitutional 
interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of 
prosecution thereunder.’”112  When Susan B. Anthony List is juxtaposed 
with Clapper, little room for doubt exists that a credible threat of 
prosecution for violating a federal statute (on which the plaintiff relied for 
standing in the former) is easier to establish than a credible threat of being 
subjected to allegedly unconstitutional surveillance related to national 
security (which the plaintiffs unavailingly claimed to face in the latter).  
The Susan B. Anthony List opinion blandly described Clapper as having 
recognized that “[a]n allegation of future injury may suffice [for standing] if 
the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk’ 
that the harm will occur.”113  
4. Standing to Assert Procedural Challenges.—In many cases, the 
redressability prong of the standing inquiry requires plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that the relief they seek would almost certainly alleviate their 
injuries.  As the Roberts Court has acknowledged, however, it makes an 
exception for cases involving “procedural rights.”114 
Allen v. Wright115 exemplifies the Supreme Court’s usual, stringent 
stance with regard to redressability.  In Allen, the Court acknowledged that 
plaintiffs seeking to challenge Internal Revenue Service policies involving 
the award of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools 
had asserted a cognizable injury in their children’s “diminished ability to 
receive an education in a racially integrated school.”116  Nevertheless, the 
majority denied standing on the ground that it was “entirely 
speculative . . . whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular 
school would lead the school to change its policies.”117 
If applied across the board, this exacting interpretation of standing’s 
redressability requirement would preclude standing in virtually all cases in 
which a plaintiff complains that the government violated procedural rights 
when making a decision adverse to the plaintiff’s concrete interests.  
Consider, for example, cases in which a plaintiff alleges that an 
 
112. Id. at 2342 (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 
(1979)). 
113. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013). 
114. Massachusets v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007) (quoting Lujan v.  Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)).  For extended discussion of the Court’s differential 
treatment of procedural rights and an argument that the disparate treatment can best be 
rationalized by acknowledging that Article III means different things in different contexts, see 
generally Lee & Ellis, supra note 4, at 215–28. 
115. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
116. Id. at 739, 756. 
117. Id. at 758 (citation omitted). 
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administrative agency failed to provide the fair hearing required by 
applicable statutes, agency regulations, or the Due Process Clause when 
deciding to impose a burdensome regulation.  If a court concludes that a 
procedural violation occurred, it will typically remand the case to the 
agency for further action consistent with its opinion.  Because the agency, 
on the remand, will remain free to reinstate its previous substantive decision 
as long as it follows proper procedures, one might think it “speculative” 
whether the only remedy that the plaintiff seeks and that the court could 
award would satisfy the redressability requirement of standing doctrine. 
The Court has responded by relaxing the redressability demand in 
cases involving procedural rights.  The Roberts Court’s most direct 
affirmation came in Massachusetts v. EPA,118 in which it upheld a state’s 
standing to challenge a refusal by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to issue regulations governing greenhouse gas emissions, despite 
uncertainty about what material effects such regulations might have.119  
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens quoted a prior decision’s recognition 
that “a litigant to whom Congress has ‘accorded a procedural right to 
protect his concrete interests’ . . . ‘can assert that right without meeting all 
the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’”120  He continued: 
“When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing 
if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-
causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the 
litigant.”121 
I have no quarrel with the Roberts Court’s classification of procedural 
rights as distinctive for purposes of applying standing doctrine’s 
redressability requirement.  Plainly, however, it furnishes a further example 
of standing’s progressive fragmentation.  
B. Standing of the State and Federal Governments and Their Officials 
The Supreme Court apparently never intended that the injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability requirements would apply to the federal and 
state governments in the same way as to private litigants.  In perhaps the 
most obvious illustration, the government need not make a showing of 
personal injury to itself or anyone else in order to initiate a criminal 
prosecution.122  But this intuitive, historically rooted conclusion has only 
 
118. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
119. Id. at 521, 525. 
120. Id. at 517–18 (quoting Lujan v.  Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)) 
(citations omitted). 
121. Id. at 518. 
122. See Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions 
Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
2239, 2251 (1999) (noting that the United States can prosecute crimes “based on nothing more 
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limited application.  The doctrines that apply to government claims of 
standing are as complexly variegated as those that regulate the standing of 
private parties. 
1.  State Standing.—An old, tangled doctrine (that the Roberts Court 
has left untouched) holds that states sometimes may bring parens patriae 
actions on behalf of their citizens.123  Although parens patriae standing 
normally requires a state to show some distinctive harm to itself in addition 
to those suffered by its citizens, the Court has sometimes accepted claims of 
injuries to states that seem “attenuated” by the standards applied to private 
litigants.124  Moreover, the demand for independent injury developed in 
suits filed in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, and the Court 
suggested in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez125 that 
the limitations developed in that context may not apply to suits filed in 
federal district court.126  Parens patriae standing has no precise analogue in 
private litigation, nor are the rules the same as those that govern the 
standing of private organizations to bring suit to protect their members’ 
interests.  
Even apart from parens patriae actions, the Roberts Court has held 
that special standing rules apply to states when they allege injury to their 
own real property and to their quasi-sovereign interests “in all the earth and 
air within [their] domain.”127  It did so in Massachusetts v. EPA, which 
arose from a determination by the Environmental Protection Agency that it 
lacked authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions that the state alleged 
were causally responsible for injuries to the state and its coastal lands.128  
Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the state had failed to 
satisfy standing’s ordinary requirements.129  Because the global warming 
caused by greenhouse gases threatens all property owners alike, the Chief 
Justice thought that Massachusetts had not alleged particularized injury,130 
and if Massachusetts’s injury lay in the loss of coastal property, the state 
failed to satisfy the demand that any threatened injury must be imminent, he 
 
than the ‘harm to the common concern for obedience to law,’ and the ‘abstract . . . injury to the 
interest in seeing that the law is obeyed.’” (quoting FEC v. Aikins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–24 (1998))). 
123. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 475 
(1995). 
124. Id. at 511–12; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 261–66 (reviewing cases 
involving a state’s standing to assert a claim on behalf of its citizens). 
125. 458 U.S. 592 (1982). 
126. Id. at 603 n.12. 
127. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007) (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper 
Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
128. Id. at 511. 
129. Id. at 536–37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
130. Id. at 541. 
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argued.131  It was also far from clear that the distinctive failure of the EPA 
to regulate greenhouse gases—rather than other contributors to the 
problem—caused any particular injuries that global warming might inflict 
on the state, Chief Justice Roberts continued.132  Nor, in his view, had 
Massachusetts established that EPA action would redress any harms that it 
might suffer, as the responses of other actors on the global stage remained 
wholly unpredictable.133  In response, Justice Stevens reasoned that 
“Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests” set it apart 
from other litigants and entitled it to “special solicitude in our standing 
analysis.”134  Dissenting, Chief Justice Roberts countered: 
The good news is that the Court’s “special solicitude” for 
Massachusetts limits the future applicability of the diluted standing 
requirements applied in this case.  The bad news is that the Court’s 
self-professed relaxation of those Article III requirements has caused 
us to transgress “the proper—and properly limited—role of the 
courts in a democratic society.”135  
However much the majority and dissenting opinions disagreed about, 
they thus concurred with respect to one important point: The Court had 
either recognized or introduced special standing rules for states suing to 
protect their property and other quasi-sovereign interests.136  
2. Assignments of Governmental Interests.—When the government or 
a government official would have standing to represent the government’s 
interests, the question has occasionally arisen whether the government can 
assign its interest to, and thereby confer standing on, a third party.  In the 
context of purely private litigation, the Roberts Court has established that 
when one party assigns its financial interests to another, a suit by the 
assignee to protect the assigned interests satisfies Article III.137  The 
Rehnquist Court had previously held, moreover, that a federal statute 
 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 543–45. 
133. Id. at 545–46. 
134. Id. at 520 (majority opinion). 
135. Id. at 548–49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 
(1984)). 
136. According to Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than 
Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1701 (2008), the Massachusetts Court “fail[ed] to define to what extent and under what 
circumstances federal courts should apply more relaxed standing requirements for states.”  Id. at 
1786.  See generally Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Essay, Massachusetts v. EPA: 
Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1046 
(2008) (arguing that Massachusetts v. EPA leaves states “in a relatively powerful position vis-à-
vis federal agencies in terms of their ability both to file suits against agencies and to seek fairly 
exacting judicial review of the agency’s reasons for declining to regulate”). 
137. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 271 (2008). 
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authorizing private citizens to bring qui tam actions on behalf of the United 
States against those who have procured payment on false claims against the 
government passed muster under Article III.138 
It is a separate question, however, whether a party to whom the 
government has purported to assign its interest in enforcing or defending 
laws in which the assignee had no prior financial stake can thereby acquire 
Article III standing.  In Hollingsworth v. Perry,139 the Court confronted a 
version of that question and, by a 5–4 vote, gave a negative answer.140  
California law authorizes the proponents of ballot initiatives that are 
approved by California voters to defend the constitutionality of those 
initiatives in court when state officials decline to do so.141  Hollingsworth 
arose after California voters enacted Proposition 8, which limited marriage 
to opposite-sex couples.  After the district court ruled Proposition 8 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, state officials declined 
to defend it any further.142  When proponents of the initiative then 
intervened, the Ninth Circuit upheld their standing to appeal.143 
The Supreme Court reversed on the standing issue.  According to 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion, the “petitioners had no ‘direct 
stake’ in the outcome of their appeal.”144  “Their only interest” was a 
generalized one, shared by myriad other California citizens, in 
“vindicat[ing] the constitutional validity of a generally applicable California 
law.”145  Having so concluded, the Chief Justice acknowledged that the state 
could have protected its undoubted interest in defending Proposition 8 by 
entrusting litigation responsibility to state officials or by “designat[ing] 
agents to represent it in federal court.”146  But the interveners were not 
California officials, nor, according to Chief Justice Roberts, did they qualify 
as state agents.147  Among other difficulties, the state retained no authority 
to control or remove them.148 
In a forceful dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy mocked the majority 
for holding that a state’s authority to secure the constitutional defense of 
state ballot initiatives that the state executive declined to defend should 
 
138. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 777–78 
(2000). 
139. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
140. Id. at 2658–61, 2668. 
141. Id. at 2660. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 2662. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 2664. 
147. Id. at 2666. 
148. Id. at 2666–67. 
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depend on compliance with the Restatement of the Law of Agency.149  By 
any fair appraisal, moreover, the narrow Court opinion needed to 
distinguish more cases than it found to rely on, including cases in which 
states had authorized officials outside the executive branch to represent 
state interests when executive officers refused.150 
For present purposes, however, there is no need to judge the merits of 
the contending positions.  Whether Hollingsworth was right or wrong, and 
whether it is read narrowly or broadly, it introduced an element of 
complexity into standing doctrine—involving permissible assignees of 
states’ interests in defending their laws against constitutional challenge—
that had not existed previously.  Moreover, whatever may be the case with 
state officials and state agents, Hollingsworth strongly suggests that there 
are general limits to governments’ capacity to assign their interests in 
litigation to private parties, at least absent financial damages. 
3. Federal Governmental Standing to Appeal: The Windsor Case.—
Just as there is ordinarily no question about the standing of the executive 
branch to initiate criminal and civil actions on behalf of the federal 
government, no issue typically arises concerning the standing of the 
executive branch to appeal adverse judgments, including those that hold 
federal statutes unconstitutional.  But an issue of standing to appeal 
emerged in United States v. Windsor,151 after the President and Attorney 
General concluded that the provision of the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) that denied federal recognition to same-sex marriages that are 
valid under state law violated the federal Constitution.152  Based on this 
determination, the executive branch could have ceased to enforce the 
provision at issue.  Instead, with the aim of framing the constitutional 
question for judicial resolution, the Administration, though not defending 
DOMA, continued to enforce it by denying Windsor an estate tax 
exemption that she would have received if federal law recognized her 
deceased partner—to whom she was lawfully married as a matter of New 
York law—as her spouse.153  The Attorney General also notified both 
houses of Congress of the Administration’s position.154  The House of 
 
149. Id. at 2671–72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
150. See id. at 2664–68 (holding that the Court had “never before upheld the standing of a 
private party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not 
to” after distinguishing Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 
(2000); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997); Gollust v. Mendell, 501 
U.S. 115 (1991); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990); United States v. Providence Journal 
Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988); Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987); and Young v. United States ex rel. 
Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987)). 
151. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
152. Id. at 2683. 
153. Id. at 2683–84. 
154. Id. at 2683. 
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Representatives responded by authorizing its Bipartisan Legal Advisory 
Group (BLAG) to intervene to defend DOMA.155  When the district court 
and the court of appeals both held DOMA unconstitutional in pertinent part, 
the United States sought certiorari, as did BLAG.156  The Court granted the 
petition but also appointed Harvard Law Professor Vicki Jackson as an 
amica curiae to argue that the United States lacked standing to appeal 
because the government agreed with Windsor that the relevant part of 
DOMA violated the Constitution.157 
If a private party who supported the judgment of the court of appeals 
had nevertheless sought certiorari, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly 
have held that that party lacked standing to appeal or otherwise failed to 
present a justiciable controversy.  In Windsor, the Roberts Court upheld 
standing.158  In reaching its decision, the Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Kennedy, began with common ground: all agreed that the district court had 
jurisdiction over Windsor’s suit to recover money she had lost due to the 
government’s refusal to classify her as the “spouse” of her deceased 
partner.159  Nor did the government’s material interest in the outcome end 
with the district court’s ruling in favor of Windsor, Justice Kennedy 
reasoned: “[T]he United States retain[ed] a stake sufficient to support 
Article III jurisdiction on appeal . . . [because the judgment] order[ed] the 
United States to pay Windsor [a tax] refund . . . .”160  “It would be a 
different case if the Executive had taken the further step of paying Windsor 
the refund,” Justice Kennedy wrote.161 
Having concluded that the United States satisfied the Article III 
requisites for standing, Justice Kennedy noted that the Court’s jurisdiction 
also depended on “prudential considerations.”162  He determined, however, 
that the presence of BLAG as an intervenor, and its “sharp adversarial 
presentation of the issues[,] satisfies the prudential concerns that otherwise 
might counsel against hearing an appeal from a decision with which the 
principal parties agree.”163  So concluding, Justice Kennedy found it 
 
155. Id. at 2684. 
156. Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (12-307); 
Supplemental Brief for the United States, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (12-307); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (12-785). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 2686. 
159. Id. at 2684–85. 
160. Id. at 2686. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 2687. 
163. Id. at 2688. 
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unnecessary to decide whether BLAG might have had standing to appeal in 
its own right.164 
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the question in Windsor 
was not one of standing at all but rather involved the requirement of 
sufficiently adverse parties to support federal appellate jurisdiction: 
Article III requires not just a plaintiff (or appellant) who has standing 
to complain but an opposing party who denies the validity of the 
complaint. . . .  The question here is not whether, as the majority puts 
it, “the United States retains a stake sufficient to support Article III 
jurisdiction,” the question is whether there is any controversy (which 
requires contradiction) between the United States and Ms. Windsor.  
There is not.165 
However one judges that contention, Windsor will enter the United 
States Reports as a decision about the standing of the United States, in 
contrast with most if not all other litigants, to appeal from judgments with 
which it agrees on the merits.166 
4. The Standing of Government Officials.—Windsor and Hollings-
worth both presuppose that duly authorized officials of the executive branch 
have standing to sue on behalf of the government whenever the government 
itself could claim standing.  Hollingsworth goes further in affirming by 
implication the holding of the Rehnquist Court in Karcher v. May167 that a 
state may designate its speaker of the house or president of the senate to 
defend a state statute that state executive officials will not defend.168  A host 
of further standing issues can come up, however, when government 
officials claim injuries to interests either of their own or of the particular 
institutions of government in which they serve. 
In Windsor, as I have noted, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion chose 
not to resolve the standing issue BLAG presented.169  Four other Justices 
 
164. Id.  For a thoughtful pre-Windsor examination of the standing of intervenor defendants, 
see generally Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539 (2012). 
165. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
166. In upholding standing, the Court relied on its earlier decisions in Hein v. Freedom from 
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); and Deposit 
Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980).  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686–87.  For the 
argument that Windsor is not a case about the standing of the United States, but about the standing 
of the Executive Branch, and that claims of the standing Congress and the President should 
depend on considerations emanating from Articles I and II, as well as from Article III, see 
generally Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311 (2014). 
167. 484 U.S. 72 (1987). 
168. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664–65 (2013) (emphasizing that Karcher 
created a precedent of standing for government officials in their official capacity, but concluding 
that Karcher offered no support for a finding of standing for private individuals acting in an 
unofficial capacity). 
169. 133 S. Ct. at 2688. 
FALLON.TERI(DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:12 AM 
2015] The Fragmentation of Standing 1087 
 
did reach that issue.  In reasoning based on a mixture of precedent and 
constitutional first principles, Justice Scalia’s dissent—which was joined by 
Justice Thomas and in pertinent part by Chief Justice Roberts—concluded 
that BLAG lacked standing.170  By contrast, Justice Alito thought that the 
threatened, de facto nullification of House votes in favor of DOMA 
constituted an institutional injury in fact.171 
In some ways analogous to Windsor, Camreta v. Greene172 presented a 
question involving standing to appeal by defendants who had prevailed in 
the lower courts.173  In the lower courts, child welfare officials defeated a 
claim for damages against them for allegedly violating a child’s Fourth 
Amendment rights when they interviewed her at her elementary school, 
without either a warrant or parental consent, in response to third-party 
allegations of parental abuse.174  But the court of appeals rested its decision 
on official immunity doctrine, not the Fourth Amendment.  It found that the 
petitioners had in fact violated the Constitution but dismissed the damages 
claim on the ground that the right in question was not “clearly established” 
at the time of the violation, as it must be for plaintiffs to recover damages in 
constitutional tort actions against most officials.175 
Alleging that the court of appeals’s constitutional ruling would 
diminish their capacity to respond effectively in future cases of suspected 
child abuse, the prevailing defendants sought Supreme Court review, and 
the Court upheld their standing.176  Justice Kagan’s majority opinion 
credited the petitioners’ allegations that the effective discharge of their 
official responsibilities required them to conduct unconsented interrogations 
of minors.177  In light of the court of appeals’s ruling, she reasoned, an 
affected official had to “change the way he performs his duties or risk a 
meritorious damages action.”178  In either case, she held, he had suffered 
“injury caused by the adverse constitutional ruling.”179 
By creating an exception to the rule that prevailing parties lack 
standing to appeal judgments in their favor,180 the Roberts Court quite 
transparently sought to accommodate a small corner of standing doctrine to 
 
170. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697, 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
171. Id. at 2712–14 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
172. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
173. Id. at 2027–28. 
174. Id. at 2027. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 2028–29, 2032. 
177. Id. at 2027. 
178. Id. at 2029. 
179. Id. 
180. The Court pointed to two other cases in which it had recognized exceptions.  Id. 
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the comparably complex doctrine of qualified immunity.181  With officials 
normally liable in damages for constitutional violations only if they violate 
“clearly established” rights,182 the Court has erected a framework that 
encourages courts of appeals to issue constitutional rulings that clarify the 
law even when they could bypass the merits altogether—as the doctrine of 
“constitutional avoidance” would normally counsel183—by upholding 
qualified immunity defenses.184  Camreta facilitates the Court’s law-
clarifying aim by creating a rule of appellate standing distinctively available 
to governmental officials who want to claim that judicial opinions 
purporting to create clearly established law have instead committed 
constitutional error.  
Reasonable minds differ about the wisdom of this accommodation.  
Reasonable minds do not dispute that Camreta introduces new complexity 
into standing doctrine in order to hasten the creation of clearly established 
law. 
C. Congressionally Authorized Standing 
The Supreme Court has unmistakably affirmed that standing doctrine’s 
demands for injury in fact, causation, and redressability apply equally to 
cases in which Congress has specifically purported to authorize standing 
and to cases in which it has not.185  But the Court has never suggested that 
congressional authorization makes no difference to standing analysis, even 
if it has never made wholly plain exactly what difference congressional 
authorization can make.  Massachusetts v. EPA maintained, and possibly 
deepened, the uncertainty.  In that case, as noted already, Justice Stevens 
emphasized the “special solicitude” due to state claims of standing, but he 
also placed weight on Congress’s authorization of the state’s suit.186  
Massachusetts thus appears to ratify an otherwise largely opaque doctrinal 
state of affairs in which the demands for injury in fact, causation, and 
 
181. Writing in dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court’s ruling breached the 
Article III precept that the jurisdiction of an appellate court lies only “to correct wrong judgments, 
not to revise opinions.”  Id. at 2037 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 
117, 126 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
182. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
183. See, e.g., Dep’t of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 
343 (1999) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of 
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . 
unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” (quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 
U.S. 101, 105 (1944))). 
184. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (explaining the benefit of clarifying 
the law applicable to constitutional issues that are rarely litigated except in suits also presenting 
qualified immunity claims). 
185. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (holding that “there 
is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of [an] asserted right”). 
186. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516, 519–20 (2007). 
FALLON.TERI(DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:12 AM 
2015] The Fragmentation of Standing 1089 
 
redressability mean one thing when Congress purported to confer standing 
and something different when Congress has not.   
D. Probabilistic Standing  
In my effort to describe the continuing fragmentation of standing 
doctrine under the Roberts Court, I have necessarily grouped cases into 
categories, but I have not meant to suggest that alternative categorizations 
would not prove equally illuminating.  One such scheme would differentiate 
cases involving injuries that have already occurred from cases in which a 
plaintiff claims standing to sue based on a threat of future injury.  Many of 
the cases that I have discussed, although in other connections, would 
occupy the latter category.187  So located, they raise the question: exactly 
how certain must it be that a threat of injury will ripen into a more tangible 
harm in order for a plaintiff to possess standing?188 
That question has no unitary answer under Roberts Court standing 
doctrine.  The fragmentation emerged most unmistakably in Clapper, in 
which the plaintiffs sought to challenge national security surveillance 
policies, and the majority denied standing because the plaintiffs had not 
shown that injury was “certainly impending.”189  In response to the 
majority’s demand, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion identified a 
compendium of cases—some very recent—in which the Court had 
employed a variety of less demanding formulations.190 
 
187. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343 (2014) (finding that 
the threat of future enforcement may constitute an injury in fact); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (denying standing based on a claim that communications may be 
illegally intercepted in the future); Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at  526 (finding that a state has 
standing based, in part, on the possibility of future harm from increasing amounts of greenhouse 
gasses in the atmosphere). 
188. For valuable academic discussions of probabilistic standing, see generally Heather 
Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 503–06, 510–11 (2008); F. Andrew 
Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55 (2012); Bradford Mank, Standing and 
Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665 (2009); and Nash, 
supra note 109. 
189. 133 S. Ct. at 1150. 
190. Justice Breyer wrote: 
[R]ecognizing that “‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat elastic concept,” Lujan 
[v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565, n.2 (1992)], the Court has referred to, or 
used (sometimes along with “certainly impending”) other phrases such as 
“reasonable probability” that suggest less than absolute, or literal certainty [that 
injury will soon occur].  See Babbitt [ v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 
289, 298 (1979)] (plaintiff “must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct 
injury” (emphasis added)); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 . . . (2000) (“[I]t is the plaintiff’s burden to 
establish standing by demonstrating that . . . the defendant’s allegedly wrongful 
behavior will likely occur or continue”).  See also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed 
Farms, [561 U.S. 139, 153] . . . (2010) (“‘“reasonable probability”’” and “sub-
stantial risk”); Davis [v. FEC], 554 U.S. [724], 734 [(2008)] . . . ; MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 . . . (2007) (“genuine threat of enforcement”); 
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In response, the majority acknowledged, in a footnote, that the Court’s 
cases do not “uniformly require” satisfaction of the “certainly impending” 
standard that it had identified as applicable.191  “In some instances,” Justice 
Alito continued, “we have found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that 
harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to 
mitigate or avoid that harm.”192  On the facts, the majority then argued, “to 
the extent that the ‘substantial risk’ standard is relevant,” the plaintiffs 
failed to meet it.193 
The varying stringency of the Court’s standard in cases involving 
probable future injuries became clearer when the Court followed Clapper 
with its unanimous decision upholding standing in Susan B. Anthony List, 
discussed above, in which the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a 
statute that made it a crime to make knowingly false statements about the 
voting record of a political candidate.194  Analogizing the case to past 
decisions in which plaintiffs had sought injunctions against the enforcement 
of allegedly unconstitutional statutes, the Court recited a formula that it had 
applied in one such case and upheld standing based on “a credible threat of 
prosecution.”195  
Although I would not pretend to be able to rationalize all of the cases, 
significant patterns stand out.  For example, juxtaposing Clapper with 
Susan B. Anthony List, I would reaffirm my earlier appraisal that the Court 
has demanded elevated showings of likely injury by parties seeking 
injunctive relief from policies that relate closely to national security.196  
Then, generalizing from Susan B. Anthony List and the previous cases on 
which it relied, I would conclude that the Court tends to accept a 
significantly lesser showing when plaintiffs sue to enjoin the enforcement 
of a statute that forbids or penalizes conduct in which they have reason to 
want to engage; in cases of that kind, a reasonable probability that 
 
Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 
333, . . . (1999) (“substantially likely” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Clinton v. 
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 432 . . . (1998) (“sufficient likelihood of economic 
injury”); Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 . . . (1988) (“realistic danger” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1001 . . . (1982) (“quite 
realistic” threat); Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 367–368 . . . (1980) (“[]likely”); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 . . . (1976) (per curiam) (“reasonable probability”). 
Id. at 1160–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
191. Id. at 1150 & n.5 (majority opinion). 
192. Id.  In support, the Court cited four cases: Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 
U.S. 139 (2010); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 
(1982); and Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979). The majority did 
not discuss the other cases on which the dissenting opinion relied.  Id. 
193. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5. 
194. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014). 
195. Id. at 2342 (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 
(1979)). 
196. See supra section II(A)(3). 
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government officials will bring an enforcement action normally suffices to 
confer standing.197  Identifying yet another category, I would further 
venture to say that the Court quite routinely imposes a heavy burden on 
plaintiffs who seek to enjoin government officials from engaging in 
allegedly unlawful actions, other than initiating civil or criminal 
enforcement proceedings, that no statute or formally promulgated policy 
requires them to take.198  To pick out just one more set of cases, I would 
credit the descriptive accuracy of the observation of the Court’s 5–4 
majority in Summers v. Earth Institute that “[w]hen the plaintiff is not 
himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, 
standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily substantially more difficult to 
establish.”199  
These efforts at explanation are, I want to emphasize, tentative and 
somewhat off-the-cuff.  Undoubtedly, the cases would permit multiple 
categorizations.  Again, I do not mean to imply that all could be fitted into 
an identifiable, defensible pattern.  But the cases are not wholly random 
either.  Prediction is not impossible.200   
One could expose similar disparities by pressing the question: what 
standard of probability does the Court employ in determining whether an 
injury is redressable through the relief that a plaintiff seeks?  The Roberts 
Court requires less certainty in cases in which the plaintiff asserts the 
violation of a procedural right than it does in ordinary cases201 and also less 
in cases in which Congress has authorized suits by states.202  But we do not 
 
197. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–29 (2007) (“[W]here 
threatened action by government is concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose himself to 
liability before bringing suit . . . .  The plaintiff’s own action (or inaction) in failing to violate the 
law eliminates the imminent threat of prosecution, but nonetheless does not eliminate Article III 
jurisdiction.”). 
198. For example, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court held: 
That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police on October 6, 1976 . . . 
does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped 
for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by an officer or officers who would 
illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance on 
his part. The additional allegation in the complaint that the police in Los Angeles 
routinely apply chokeholds in situations where they are not threatened by the use of 
deadly force falls far short of the allegations that would be necessary to establish a 
case or controversy between these parties. 
461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). 
199. 555 U.S. 488, 489, 493 (2009) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
562 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
200. If a simple pattern were wanted for normative reasons, there would be force to Professor 
Jonathan Nash’s proposal that standing doctrine should allow plaintiffs to sue whenever they have 
suffered a loss of expected value: “A 1-in-10,000 chance of losing $100,000 is the equivalent of a 
$10 loss . . . and a $10 loss is an injury.”  Nash, supra note 109, at 1285; see also Hessick, supra 
note 188, at 69 (“[A]ny risk of harm, even a tiny one, should suffice for Article III standing.”). 
201. See supra section II(A)(4). 
202. See supra section II(B)(1). 
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know whether there is a single standard for ordinary cases or whether 
different kinds of cases—as defined by the provision of law under which 
they are brought, the invasiveness of the relief that they seek,203 or other 
variables—call for the application of different criteria. 
In asserting that standing doctrine has grown more fragmented with 
nearly every Term of the Roberts Court, I do not wish to overstate my case.  
However prone the Justices may be to fracture in some important cases, the 
Roberts Court has preserved, rather than upset, what might be thought of as 
a relatively broad pseudo-equilibrium, predicated on an unvaried formula 
under which standing requires injury in fact, causation, and redress-
ability.204  And that formula dictates determinate, predictable outcomes in 
most standing cases.  For example, there are many contexts in which 
virtually all would concur that I could not plausibly claim injury arising 
from what I believe to be a violation of someone else’s rights.  Discord 
persists and fragmentation occurs mostly at the margins—but at margins 
that are demonstrably expanding and that frequently involve matters of high 
constitutional and practical importance. 
III. A Provisional and Partial Normative Assessment 
So far I have argued that standing doctrine is complex and fragmented 
but not that a more unitary approach—with fewer subcategories and 
exceptions—would be better.  Nor do I propose now to advance a strong 
normative thesis about the optimal design of standing law, including a 
specification of its optimal complexity.  I shall offer prescriptive 
suggestions, although less ambitious ones, in Part VI.  But a prior question 
is now ripe: Does the current law contain signals that something is amiss? 
The analysis in Part II strongly supports an affirmative answer to that 
question.  In principle, doctrinal complexity such as that described in Part II 
could promote valid purposes, even if it made knowledge of the law harder 
to attain.  Nearly all rules are over or underinclusive when measured against 
their background justifications.205  Without wholly eliminating over and 
underinclusivity, a more complex system of rules might, under some 
circumstances, produce better outcomes than a simpler, more elegant 
doctrinal structure.  But current standing doctrine seems poorly designed to 
 
203. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their 
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 635–36 (2006) (emphasizing the 
connection between justiciability rulings and concerns about unacceptably intrusive remedies). 
204. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011) 
(asserting and citing authority establishing that standing requires injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (same); Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (same). 
205. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION 
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 31–34 (1991) (“A rule’s factual 
predicate is a generalization [that is] . . . not necessarily true for all cases.”). 
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achieve the benefits that a complex but coherently integrated rule structure 
might afford.  The Roberts Court has not only failed to bring elegance to 
standing doctrine, it has also done a poor job of explicating how some 
elements relate to others.  The Court frequently fails to give fully 
rationalized accounts of the lines of division that its cases actually reflect.206  
Perhaps most notably, the Court recurrently but misleadingly suggests that 
injury in fact is indeed a question of fact,207 even though—as Part II 
demonstrated—what counts as a cognizable injury sometimes varies with 
the provision under which a plaintiff brings suit or with the nature of the 
relief that a plaintiff seeks. 
As a result, whatever the benefits that complexity might produce in 
principle, costs bulk needlessly large in practice, as it becomes increasingly 
difficult for anyone but a specialist to identify all of the potentially relevant 
doctrinal categories and the different modes of analysis for which they call.  
Moreover, given the confusing and misleading rationales for decision that 
the Court frequently offers, even specialists often and understandably 
disagree about which rules apply to new cases.208  Competing analogies, 
 
206. Among these lines of division, as I shall explain more fully below, see infra subpart 
VI(A), is the line between cases presenting issues about the standing of governments and their 
officers and those involving the standing of private parties. 
207. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (holding that petitioners 
who sought to vindicate the constitutional validity of a state ballot initiative that they had 
sponsored had suffered no injury “that affects [them] in a ‘personal and individual way,’” had no 
“‘direct stake in the outcome’ of the case,” and thus had not suffered an injury in fact (quoting 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992), and Arizonans for Official English 
v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997))); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 
1449 (2011) (asserting that standing to enforce the Establishment Clause depends on “real injury 
to particular individuals”). 
208. For example, the Clapper, Hollingsworth, and Windsor cases all provoked divergent 
predictions.  Compare Steve Vladeck, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l: Secret Surveillance, Standing, 
and the Supreme Court, LAWFARE (Feb. 20, 2012, 1:23 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/201 
2/02/clapper-v-amnesty/, archived at http://perma.cc/URD7-KJ4L (hypothesizing that the Court 
might uphold standing in light of  “a specific (and public) statutory authorization for surveillance 
that necessarily gives some fairly strong clues (to both private parties and the courts) as to how 
those whom the statute bars the government from targeting could nevertheless end up having their 
communications intercepted”), with Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Can Global Wiretaps Be 
Challenged?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 26, 2012, 12:11 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/ 
argument-preview-can-global-wiretaps-be-challenged/, archived at http://perma.cc/R826-WT74 
(“It is difficult to argue that the Court granted review in this case for any reason other than to 
reverse the Circuit Court’s finding of ‘standing’ for the challengers. . . .  [T]his is a Court with a 
majority that does not have an expansive view of Article III ‘standing’ . . . .”); compare Vikram 
Amar, Revisiting Standing: Proposition 8 in the Ninth Circuit, JURIST (Feb. 16, 2012, 8:00 AM), 
http://jurist.org/forum/2012/02/vikram-amar-marriage-standing.php, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
KS3L-ZED9 (“I will not be surprised if the Supreme Court concludes that the requirements of 
federal standing are not necessarily met by the proponents in the Proposition 8 setting itself.”), 
and Laurence Tribe & Richard Parker, Tribe Offers Predictions on Gay Marriage Rulings, 
HARVARD L. TODAY (May 8, 2013), http://today.law.harvard.edu/tribe-offers-predictions-on-gay-
marriage-rulings, archived at http://perma.cc/H5TQ-QCGK (“As to Hollingsworth . . .  I doubt 
that the Court will conclude that Chuck Cooper and the other private proponents of Prop 8, all 
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which support different results, often exist.  Uncertainty spreads, as does 
frustration and suspicion of naked, result-oriented manipulation. 
In sum, even if complexity is not per se objectionable, modern 
standing doctrine has sunk into a combined state of complexity and 
confusion that no one could applaud.  What is more, its condition seems to 
be worsening, not improving, under the Roberts Court.   
IV. Possible Explanations 
If standing doctrine has descended into under-theorized and poorly 
explained fragmentation, it is worth asking why.  Among other things, 
identifying the factors that have produced fragmentation will serve a 
diagnostic function.  Those factors help to define the challenge that 
proponents of doctrinal reform confront.  A sophisticated understanding of 
causal factors will thus help to ground judgments concerning viable reform 
strategies.  
In seeking insight into why standing doctrine has fallen into its 
currently untidy, fragmented state, I shall highlight four partial 
explanations.  Although all build upon the insights of social scientists, none, 
I want to emphasize, denies the fundamental proposition that judges and 
Justices have an obligation, which they normally attempt to satisfy, to 
decide cases in accordance with applicable law. 
Two examples should suffice as reminders of the role of purely legal 
considerations in standing determinations.  First, stare decisis plainly 
influences the Justices to greater or lesser degrees.  In one visible, though 
not necessarily representative example, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Kennedy and Alito seem deeply reluctant to overrule Flast v. Cohen, even 
though their tenuous efforts to distinguish it strongly suggest that they do 
not agree with its core reasoning.209  More generally, a commitment to stare 
 
lacking a fiduciary duty to California, have Art. III standing to defend it on the merits in the 
Supreme Court . . . .”), with John Bursch, Reading Tea Leaves: Why the Court Will Uphold 
Proposition 8, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 28, 2013, 11:59 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/ 
reading-tea-leaves-why-the-court-will-uphold-proposition-8/, archived at http://perma.cc/K6Z7-
SY94 (“California undisputedly has standing to defend the constitutionality of its own 
constitution, and it also has the authority to delegate the authority to mount that defense.”); 
compare Tribe & Parker, supra (“[M]y hunch . . . is that the Court will narrowly conclude that the 
DOMA . . . issue is properly before SCOTUS on the merits notwithstanding the solid reasons to 
doubt that BLAG . . . is a proper representative of Congress . . . .”), with Vikram David Amar, 
Does BLAG Have Standing in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Case in Front of the Supreme 
Court?, VERDICT (Feb. 14, 2013), https://verdict.justia.com/2013/02/14/does-blag-have-standing-
in-the-defense-of-marriage-act-doma-case-in-front-of-the-supreme-court archived at http://perma 
.cc/49AQ-CYDT (“I won’t be surprised if the Court (or a large enough number of individual 
Justices on the Court) effectively defers these cases and avoids issuing dispositive rulings on the 
merits using the flexible justiciability doctrine.”). 
209. See Gene R. Nichol, Professor, Univ. of N.C., The Roberts Court and Access to Justice, 
Keynote address at the Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium: Access to the Courts in 
the Roberts Era (Jan. 30, 2009), in 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 821, 827–28 (2009) (characterizing 
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decisis may explain some of the Justices’ unwillingness to reconsider the 
assumption—which has underlain virtually all of the Court’s opinions since 
the 1970s—that standing depends on prelegal injury in fact.  To confess a 
doctrinally global conceptual error might seem to some Justices to go too 
far in undermining the interests in legal stability and continuity that the 
doctrine of stare decisis exists to protect.  I shall return to this consideration 
below when I offer proposals for reform. 
Second, Justice Scalia’s commitment to an originalist methodology 
likely influenced his decision upholding standing based on the 
government’s assignment of a financial interest in litigation to a private 
party in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens.210  As he emphasized, precedents for qui tam litigation extend to 
the colonial era and formed part of the backdrop against which Article III 
was written and ratified.211 
Nonetheless, acknowledgment of the significance of legal or even 
legalistic considerations does not preclude the possibility of further 
illumination from the insights and methodologies of social scientists.  Those 
insights are partly overlapping.  The first two of the possible explanations 
that I shall offer for the fragmentation of standing may embody the 
complementary perspectives of political science and psychology on 
phenomena that approach extensional equivalence.  Nor, in citing possible 
social–scientific explanations for the fragmentation of standing, do I mean 
to suggest that any one of the four explanatory themes that I shall advance 
here could explain all elements of the Roberts Court’s standing 
jurisprudence without help from others.  Making sense of the fragmentation 
of standing doctrine is a multifaceted undertaking. 
A. Insofar as Standing Is Interconnected with the Merits, Ideology 
Matters 
Because the notion of injury in fact is too plastic to do the analytical 
work that standing doctrine demands of it, and some determinations of 
injury therefore require substantive judgments about the protections that 
various constitutional provisions confer,212 the Justices’ substantive 
constitutional views inevitably drive standing decisions in a number of 
 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Hein as adopting the position that “we’ve been idiotic on this 
front for forty years and idiotic we’ll remain”); supra notes 44–61 and accompanying text. 
210. 529 U.S. 765 (2000). 
211. Id. at 774, 776–78. 
212. See Fletcher, supra note 43, at 234 (arguing that standing analysis requires “paying 
careful attention to the nature of the substantive right at issue in the particular case”); Sunstein, 
supra note 5, at 186–92 (criticizing the failure of Data Processing to explain the legal source of its 
“unprecedented approach to standing” and the assumption that injury in fact can be a purely 
factual matter). 
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important areas.213  Abundant examples confirm this thesis.  With the 
Roberts Court, as with predecessor Courts, it is possible to distinguish 
judicial conservatives from liberals and to characterize some standing 
rulings as having either a liberal or a conservative valence.  Although these 
labels carry undoubted risks of imprecision, it will suffice for current 
purposes to characterize judicial rulings as either conservative or liberal 
when they produce outcomes that political conservatives or liberals, as 
those terms are used in common parlance, would respectively applaud.214  
When the terms are used in this way, nearly everyone agrees that the 
Roberts Court consists of five conservatives (Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy) and four liberals (Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan), with Justice Kennedy most 
often the Justice most nearly in the middle. 
To take a plain example of substantively conservative views driving 
conservative rulings, the Roberts Court’s decisions cutting back on taxpayer 
standing to challenge Establishment Clause violations under Flast align 
almost precisely with political conservatives’ views about the 
Establishment Clause’s protective scope.215  In conservative eyes, the 
Establishment Clause does not ordinarily prohibit the government from 
offering symbolic support for religion nor does it bar the provision of 
financial benefits to religious and non-religious institutions on a neutral 
basis.216  Liberals tend to hold more “separationist” views with respect to 
the proper substantive interpretation of the Establishment Clause and 
 
213. Among political scientists, insistence on the pertinence of the Justices’ ideologies in 
predicting their voting patterns comes most stridently from proponents of the so-called “attitudinal 
model.”  See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 312–26 (2002) (applying the attitudinal model to Supreme Court voting 
patterns). 
214. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 32 (2d ed. 2013) (noting political scientists’ 
use of common parlance as a measure of whether judicial action is liberal or conservative). 
215. For example, in a New York Times article published after the Supreme Court’s rulings in 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), and McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 
844 (2005), James C. Dobson of the conservative Focus on the Family Action in Colorado Springs 
cast the cases in the following terms: “The court has failed to decide whether it will stand up for 
religious freedom of expression, or if it will allow liberal special interests to banish God from the 
public square.”  Ralph Blumenthal, Split Rulings on Displays Draw Praise and Dismay, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/28/politics/28display.html?_r=1&, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7JXF-Z9GD. 
216. The Supreme Court’s most conservative Justices regularly take this view in decisions on 
the merits in Establishment Clause cases.  See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681 (upholding 
Texas’s display of the Ten Commandments on the State Capitol grounds); McCreary Cnty., 545 
U.S. at 885–89 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating a less rigid separation of church and state); 
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding that an aid program 
benefiting religious as well as secular schools did not violate the Establishment Clause “because it 
determines eligibility for aid neutrally, allocates that aid based on the private choices of the 
parents of schoolchildren, and does not provide aid that has an impermissible content”). 
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correspondingly broader assessments of what constitutes actionable 
injury.217 
The standing ruling in Clapper invites a similarly ideological 
explanation.  The Court’s most conservative Justices favor greater 
deference to the executive branch in national security matters than do its 
more liberal members.218  That division manifested itself in a 5–4 split in 
Clapper about whether the plaintiffs satisfied standing doctrine’s injury-in-
fact requirement and, even if so, about whether their injury was “fairly 
traceable” to the statute that they sought to challenge.219  
Based on Clapper and the Establishment Clause cases, one might be 
tempted to conclude that the Roberts Court’s conservative Justices simply 
have more restrictive understandings of the kind of injury necessary to 
support Article III standing, and similarly of the requisite assurance of 
redressability, than do the Court’s relative liberals.220  Even if this were 
typically so—and I am not sure that it is—there are ideologically driven 
exceptions.  Conservatives who regard affirmative action as deeply suspect 
if not per se unconstitutional have not demanded wallet injury or even proof 
that a disappointed white applicant would have received a sought-after 
benefit in the absence of racial preferences in order to establish standing: 
the mere interposition of a race-based criterion suffices to create an 
actionable injury.221  Where procedural rights protect liberty and property 
interests of a kind protected at common law, conservatives have similarly 
 
217. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1460–63 (2011) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing for strong separation between religion and the state while 
advocating taxpayer standing to uphold the separation); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found. 
Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 642–43 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing for taxpayer standing broad 
enough to permit judicial enforcement of constitutional norms calling for separation between 
church and state). 
218. In Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), for example, the Court’s four liberal 
Justices joined Justice Kennedy in emphasizing the function of the judicial branch in enforcing 
constitutional norms in an opinion holding that habeas corpus protections extend to noncitizen 
prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, despite the Executive’s classification of the prisoners as 
enemy combatants.  Id. at 730, 732, 765–66.  By contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Boumediene 
exemplified the more characteristically conservative position of according great deference to the 
Executive in wartime.  See id. at 827–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
219. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142–43 (2013). 
220. Cf. Richard Murphy, Abandoning Standing: Trading a Rule of Access for a Rule of 
Deference, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 943, 946–47 (2008) (characterizing standing disputes as an 
ideological struggle in which conservatives favor greater restrictions than liberals). 
221. In Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. 
City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993), Justice Thomas wrote: 
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one 
group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the 
former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have 
obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing. 
Id. at 666. 
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supported a relaxation of standing’s redressability requirement.222  With 
commercial farmers’ economic interests at stake, the Roberts Court’s most 
conservative Justices also joined Justice Alito’s opinion upholding standing 
based on a “reasonable probability” or “substantial risk” of injury arising 
from a decision by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service in 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms223—a stark contrast with their 
insistence in Clapper that injury must be “certainly impending.”224  
In my view, ideologically rooted divisions of this kind are probably 
inevitable.  Determinations of who is entitled to sue ultimately depend on 
disputable judgments about the scope of the rights that particular statutory 
and constitutional provisions confer.  It would enhance conceptual clarity 
and legal transparency, however, if the Court would say so openly.  I shall 
return to this theme in Part VI. 
B. The Importance of “Motivated Reasoning” 
In a marvelous foreword to the Harvard Law Review’s 2011 Supreme 
Court edition, Professor Dan Kahan called attention to modern 
psychological research that establishes the propensity of human beings to 
embrace factual claims, as well as arguments, that cohere well with their 
preexisting normative commitments.225  Symmetrically, most of us tend to 
look skeptically on factual assertions as well as arguments that contradict 
our prior, ideologically suffused set of beliefs.  Psychologists refer to this 
phenomenon as “motivated reasoning.”226  They emphasize, moreover, that 
the motivation to accept some claims and reject others is frequently 
unconscious, not conscious.227  Pushing Professor Kahan’s argument 
slightly further than he expressly takes it, I would suggest that Supreme 
Court Justices do not differ greatly from the rest of us in their proclivities to 
appraise the persuasiveness of arguments and factual assertions in light of 
their ideological congeniality as measured by the Justices’ own normative 
lights. 
If one acknowledges the existence of motivated reasoning as a 
psychological phenomenon, it immediately emerges as a candidate to shape 
the application of legal concepts as amorphous as those of injury in fact and 
 
222. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557, 572 n.7 (1992) (“There is this 
much truth to the assertion that ‘procedural rights’ are special: The person who has been accorded 
a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the 
normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”). 
223. 561 U.S. 139, 142, 153 (2010). 
224. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150. 
225. Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, 
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19–20 
(2011). 
226. Id. at 7. 
227. Id. at 19. 
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redressability—and, indeed, possibly to explain one of the mechanisms 
through which Justices’ political ideologies manifest themselves in standing 
cases.  Quasi-realist accounts of the Supreme Court’s standing rulings 
sometimes suggest that the Justices calculatingly manipulate malleable 
concepts to advance a nakedly ideological agenda.228  Thus, when a 
conservative Justice writes in one case that Article III requires “Wallet 
Injury” to ground standing,229 but conservatives hold in another that race-
based classifications are inherently injurious even if they occasion no 
economic cost to the white plaintiffs who challenge them,230 critics have 
sometimes responded with attributions of bad faith.231  Motivated reasoning 
offers an alternative explanation for a similar and possibly extensionally 
equivalent set of phenomena.  
Recognition that the Justices are roughly as prone to motivated 
reasoning as the rest of us would have at least a modest practical payoff.  
We might achieve more psychological insight, and thus a better 
understanding of how judges and Justices are likely to respond to other 
claims of injury in future cases, if we credited the possibility that a Justice’s 
ideological predispositions may shape her good-faith views of which 
distinctions are well justified and which are legally untenable. 
In my view, for example, Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion in 
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn exposed the Court’s 
denial of standing as flatly insupportable absent an overruling of prior 
cases.232  If a plaintiff would have standing to challenge a state’s funding of 
religious education through financial appropriations, it makes no economic 
sense to hold that a taxpayer does not suffer the same harm, and thus 
possess an equal claim to standing, when the state gives an equivalent 
subsidy in the form of a tax deduction.  Nevertheless, Professor Kahan’s 
 
228. Chayes, supra note 3, at 56 (“[P]osing the question whether public law litigation[] [is] 
seemingly an expression of a liberal and reformist ideology in the legal system.”); Pierce, supra 
note 3, at 1743 (“The applicable [standing] doctrines are so malleable, however, that it is 
impossible to avoid the inference that the Justices manipulated the doctrines to rationalize their 
politically preferred results.”). 
229. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 619–20 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
230. See, e.g., Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of 
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 658, 666 (1993) (holding that challengers to a race-based affirmative 
action program need not establish that they would have received material benefits in order to have 
standing to challenge the imposition of a barrier to their receipt of those benefits). 
231. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1496 
(1995) (maintaining that the racial disparities in standing cases brought by whites and those 
brought by minority plaintiffs “seem to violate the Supreme Court’s own interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause because other evidence of Supreme Court racial attitudes indicates that 
the Court is engaged in intentional racial discrimination”). 
232. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1463, 1450 (2011) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that the Court’s denial of standing contradicted the Court’s precedents). 
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thesis shakes my confidence that all of the Justices in the majority must 
surely so recognize. 
C. The Sometime Relevance of “Strategic Actor” Models 
In my judgment, it is impossible to give a persuasive account of the 
behavior of American judges and Justices that does not posit their 
commitment to governance through law and the even-handed enforcement 
of legal rules.233  But one can coherently deny that the Justices routinely 
cast strategic votes in standing cases while affirming that they cast strategic 
votes—by which I mean votes that do not reflect principles that they would 
be prepared to live with in future cases that would be difficult to distinguish 
on principled grounds from time to time.  Although I cannot prove it, I 
would speculate that the outcomes in some of the Roberts Court’s most 
controverted standing cases may have involved strategic voting by one or 
more Justices whose positions controlled the outcome. 
An example may come from Hollingsworth v. Perry, in which the 
Court held 5–4 that the sponsors of the California ballot proposition that 
abolished gay marriage in the state lacked standing to defend it after 
California officials ceased to do so.234  For constitutional purposes, the state 
of California indisputably had an interest in defending Proposition 8.  And 
if California can permissibly make law through an initiative process 
designed to circumvent the possibly obstructive efforts of elected officials, 
then one might expect that California should also be able to make special 
provisions for the defense of ballot initiatives, again to avoid the possibly 
obstructive stances of state officials.  No precedent dictated otherwise.  To 
the contrary, in holding that the defenders of Proposition 8 lacked the injury 
requisite for standing, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion struggled to 
distinguish a number of cases in which states had authorized officials or 
agents to litigate on behalf of the state.235  
In the end, one cannot know for sure, but at least some of the Justices 
who made up the majority in Hollingsworth would appear to have had 
strategic reasons—albeit different ones—to want to avoid a ruling on the 
merits of that case.236  In United States v. Windsor, which held 5–4 that a 
 
233. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 992 
(2009) (asserting that judges and Justices are “deeply socialized . . . to believe that there are legal 
norms independent of personal preference” and that they rarely think of deviating from those 
norms). 
234. 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2658–61, 2668 (2013). 
235. Id. at 2664–65. 
236. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial 
Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 146 (2013) (asserting that the Court in Hollingsworth likely 
avoided the constitutional issue because some of the justices “were not yet prepared to impose gay 
marriage on the states”). 
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provision of DOMA violated equal protection norms,237 Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion flatly asserted that although the majority reserved the 
question whether state prohibitions against same-sex marriage were also 
unconstitutional, the rationale of the Court’s opinion revealed that a 
majority of “this Court” would so hold.238  If so, then Chief Justice Roberts, 
who dissented in Windsor, would have had an obvious strategic reason to 
want to avoid a ruling on the equal protection issue that Hollingsworth 
otherwise would have presented.  So, although for quite different reasons, 
might Justice Ginsburg, who voted with the majority in Windsor but found 
no standing in Hollingsworth.  Justice Ginsburg has famously and 
repeatedly argued that the Court went too far, too fast in its decision in Roe 
v. Wade.239  In comparison, the conjunction of Windsor’s invalidation of an 
important provision of DOMA with Hollingsworth’s avoidance of issues 
concerning the constitutionality of state prohibitions of same-sex marriage 
may have reflected a step-at-a-time approach more to Justice Ginsburg’s 
liking.  Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan also might have preferred to 
advance slowly. 
A comparison of the standing issues in Windsor with those in 
Hollingsworth supports this speculation.  In the view of many observers, 
Windsor—in which the United States trumpeted its agreement with the 
judgment that it sought to appeal—presented more formidable obstacles to 
standing than did Hollingsworth.240  But five Justices clearly wanted to 
reach the merits in Windsor, with Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
frankly acknowledging that there were powerful “prudential” reasons—
involving the desirability of clarifying the law to be applied by district 
courts in ninety-four judicial districts across the United States—for the 
 
237. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681, 2696. 
238. Id. at 2709. 
239. See, e.g., Allen Pusey, Ginsburg: Court Should Have Avoided Broad-Based Decision in 
Roe v. Wade, A.B.A. J. (May 13, 2013, 2:20 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/gins 
burg_expands_on_her_disenchantment_with_roe_v._wade_legacy/, archived at http://perma.cc/7 
6JD-KQZV (reporting Justice Ginsburg’s recent criticism of Roe).  Justice Ginsburg has long 
maintained that, in contrast with the Supreme Court’s methodical line of “gender classification” 
cases such as Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973), “Roe v. Wade sparked public opposition and academic criticism . . . because the Court 
ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an incomplete justification for its action.”  
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 
N.C. L. REV. 375, 376 (1985) (footnote omitted); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a 
Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198 (1992) (“Measured motions seem to me right, in the 
main, for constitutional as well as common law adjudication.  Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, 
experience teaches, may prove unstable.”). 
240. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Tara Grove, Commentary on Marriage Grants: Article III & 
Same-Sex Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 8, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/ 
12/commentary-on-marriage-grants-article-iii-same-sex-marriage/, archived at http://perma.cc/9G 
2J-JXSM (considering standing issues in DOMA and Proposition 8 cases and predicting the 
Proposition 8 proponents in Hollingsworth would be able to establish standing). 
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Court to resolve the equal protection issue.241  If the decision to deny 
standing in Hollingsworth required one or more strategic votes, the same 
may be true of the decision to uphold standing in Windsor.242 
Having offered these speculations, I hasten to add qualifications and 
caveats.  First, the phenomenon of motivated reasoning, as discussed above, 
numbers among my reasons for caution in asserting that particular Justices 
may have engaged in strategic voting in particular cases.  Even absent a 
self-conscious decision to act strategically, some Justices may find the 
standing arguments that pull them where they would like to go more 
powerful than those that would push them in an ideologically or 
strategically inconvenient direction.  Accordingly, to say, for example, that 
Chief Justice Roberts would have had strategic reasons to want to deny 
standing in Hollingsworth v. Perry is not to say that he made a self-
conscious decision to act on those reasons.243  Motivated reasoning would 
often propel Justices in the same direction as strategic calculation (that the 
Justices might truthfully insist that they had never performed). 
Second, because standing determinations sometimes necessarily reflect 
judgments about the substantive guarantees of particular constitutional 
provisions, I would not categorize decisions that restrict standing to enforce 
the Establishment Clause, for example, as strategic in the relevant sense.  I 
would reserve that label for a Justice’s decisions to deviate from whatever 
would be her best, conscientious interpretation of standing doctrine in order 
to achieve an ideologically attractive outcome in a particular case. 
Finally, in suggesting that the strategic actor hypothesis has 
explanatory power with respect to the votes of some Justices in some cases, 
I mean to affirm my belief that most of the Justices’ voting behavior is not 
strategic in the relevant sense.  Rather, my suggestion has affinities with the 
jurisprudential position that Professor Fred Schauer has labeled “pre-
sumptive positivism.”244  The defining premise of presumptive positivism 
holds that although legal rules are “presumptively controlling,” a “rule will 
be set aside when the result it indicates is egregiously at odds with the result 
that is indicated by [a] larger and more morally acceptable set of values.”245  
Analogously, I would suggest that some of the Justices of the Roberts Court 
 
241. Windsor, 113 S. Ct. at 2676, 2688. 
242. Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Hollingsworth may have obliquely so hinted.  
See id. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Of course, the Court must be cautious before entering a 
realm of controversy where the legal community and society at large are still formulating ideas 
and approaches to a most difficult subject.  But it is shortsighted to misconstrue principles of 
justiciability to avoid that subject.”). 
243. But cf. Klarman, supra note 236, at 145–46 (observing that “[i]t is especially difficult to 
fathom how [an] ordinarily staunch defender[] of the states’ constitutional prerogatives such as 
Chief Justice Roberts . . . could deny states the authority to determine who gets to defend the 
constitutionality of their laws in federal court” (footnotes omitted)). 
244. SCHAUER, supra note 205, at 203. 
245. Id. at 204–05. 
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may make strategic decisions with respect to standing when, but only when, 
the stakes seem to them to be extraordinarily large. 
D. The Supreme Court as a “They,” Not an “It”  
Although there is a natural tendency to refer to the Supreme Court as a 
unitary body, political scientists emphasize the obvious reality that the 
Court is “a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”246  The nine Justices disagree with one 
another about numerous matters.  What is more, many of the Roberts 
Court’s most important and controversial standing rulings, like those of 
prior Courts, have come by 5–4 votes.  On an ideologically divided Court, it 
may frequently be the case that a majority of the Justices would like to 
clarify the law by pushing it decisively in one direction or the other but that 
they disagree about the direction in which to move.  If so, a swing Justice 
may cast the decisive vote.  And a succession of relatively eccentric swing 
votes can sow confusion. 
With respect to standing as with respect to so much else, Justice 
Kennedy has most often been the Roberts Court’s swing Justice in 
important cases.247  With Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, Justice 
Kennedy has voted to pare taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases, 
but he has resisted overruling Flast v. Cohen.248  Above I opined that the 
most recent decision cutting back on Flast, in Arizona Christian Schools 
Tuition Organization v. Winn, is legally and logically indefensible: the 
Court should either follow Flast (as I understand its holding) or overrule 
it.249  For all I know—for it is impossible to be certain of the Justices’ actual 
thoughts and motivations—six or even seven Justices may agree that the 
controlling opinions in recent decisions rest on dubious distinctions.  But 
the swing Justices do not.  In any event, their views control. 
Massachusetts v. EPA, which holds that states are entitled to “special 
solicitude” in standing analysis,250 furnishes another example of a case in 
which the idiosyncratic views of a single Justice may have determined the 
stated basis for the Court’s decision.  In addition to believing that states 
were not entitled to any special solicitude with respect to standing, four 
dissenting Justices thought that Massachusetts had no standing under 
 
246. This idea received its most powerful introduction into the legal literature in Adrian 
Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005). 
247. Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1061, 
1070 (2009). 
248. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 616 (2007) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); see Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1439, 1446–47 
(2011) (relying on Flast to reject respondents’ reliance on the exception to the rule against 
taxpayer standing). 
249. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
250. 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). 
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ordinarily applicable principles.251  At the other end of the spectrum, the 
Court’s four liberals might well have stood ready to hold that the state 
satisfied more ordinary principles—though I cannot pretend to be sure.  
Justice Kennedy, who has recurrently affirmed that the Constitution 
reserves to the states a number of sovereign and quasi-sovereign 
prerogatives,252 held the fifth vote that the liberals needed in order to 
prevail.  Unsurprisingly under the circumstances, Justice Stevens’s majority 
opinion not only quoted extensively from prior opinions by Justice 
Kennedy253 but also advanced a “special solicitude” rationale that no Justice 
besides Justice Kennedy may have found either adequate or necessary to 
support the judgment.254 
As others have noted, recognition that the Supreme Court is “a ‘they,’ 
not an ‘it’” complicates ready dispositions to criticize “the Court” for 
producing confused or confusing doctrine.255  Norms of individual behavior 
do not always apply sensibly or even coherently to multimember 
institutions.256 
V. Contrasting Standing with Other Doctrines 
In describing standing doctrine as having become increasingly 
fragmented under the Roberts Court, I have depended at least implicitly on 
a contrast with other doctrines.  If all constitutional doctrines grew more 
fragmented with each passing Supreme Court Term, then standing 
doctrine’s fragmentation would hardly bear comment.  In some areas of the 
law, however, the Court more comprehensively settles matters, at least for a 
time.257  A good, multifactored account of the enforcement, reformation, 
and fracturing of standing doctrine should therefore identify the specific 
 
251. Id. at 535, 540. 
252. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691–92 (2013) (declaring the 
regulation of marriage to be a state function); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“[The 
states] are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the 
dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.”). 
253. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516–17 (quoting Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
in Lujan); id. at 519 (quoting Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Alden). 
254. Id. at 520. 
255. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 
814–17 (1982) (noting that voting paradoxes make it difficult or impossible for multimember 
institutions to render consistent decisions in cases requiring sequential voting on multiple issues); 
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 102–15 
(1986) (discussing the logic and some paradoxes of group decision making in the judiciary). 
256. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 9, 14–37 (2011) 
(discussing fallacies in attempts to extrapolate from claims about individual behavior to claims 
about group behavior, including fallacies “of composition” and “of division”). 
257. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing 
the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 111–26 (1997) (discussing ordinary adjudication 
pursuant to established doctrines). 
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conditions that have prevented more stable equilibria from emerging with 
respect to standing, in contrast with what has happened in other areas.   
Any effort to develop a general theory about conditions for the 
emergence of relatively stable doctrinal equilibria would swiftly draw me 
far beyond my competence.  Nevertheless, I shall hazard a few observations 
about what makes standing law at least partly distinctive. 
A first, obvious consideration involves the Roberts Court’s 
composition.  The Justices who have sat on the Roberts Court have divided 
about standing issues in ways that they have not divided about all other 
issues and, equally crucially, in ways that another set of Justices need not 
have divided.  For example, with a change of just one or two Justices at the 
Court’s center, the resulting majority could decisively resolve currently 
tangled and controverted issues of standing to enforce the Establishment 
Clause one way or the other. 
Second, as I have emphasized, standing doctrine includes a peculiar 
mixture of transsubstantive and substantive elements.  Despite the Court’s 
pretensions to the contrary, standing inquiries cannot be wholly trans-
substantive because, as I have argued, courts cannot give content to the 
concept of injury, in particular, without reference to the guarantees of 
particular constitutional provisions.258  This being so, it seems almost 
inevitable that increasingly varied characterizations of injuries and non-
injuries should emerge over time and should spawn increasing doctrinal 
complexity, as the Justices have appraised more claims of injury under 
multifarious constitutional provisions. 
Third, standing cases are diverse not only in the constitutional and 
statutory provisions under which they arise but also in the parties who 
litigate them.  The formative cases in the Supreme Court’s development of 
its tripartite standing formula mostly involved private suits against the 
government and its officials.259  With the Justices’ thinking likely focused 
on such cases, it is understandable that concepts advanced with private 
challenges to governmental action in mind would apply awkwardly to later 
cases in which governments and their officials claimed standing as 
plaintiffs or appellants.260  Further, largely unforeseen challenges that call 
for complex solutions have also, perhaps predictably, developed from 
congressional efforts to confer standing and, in particular, from 
probabilistic injuries, which can take a dizzying variety of forms.  
 
258. See supra subpart II(A). 
259. See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 28 (1976); Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 210–11 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 
418 U.S. 166, 167 & n.1 (1974). 
260. For praise of Windsor’s result (though not all of its reasoning), on the ground that it 
permits “the Executive to facilitate judicial review by enforcing but refusing to defend a 
challenged law,” see generally Ryan W. Scott, Standing to Appeal and Executive Non-Defense of 
Federal Law After the Marriage Cases, 89 IND. L.J. 67 (2014). 
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Fourth, standing is a gateway doctrine, and the Justices may feel 
special, relatively ad hoc pressures either to let particular cases into or to 
keep them out of court.261  Consistent with this hypothesis, the Supreme 
Court has long claimed that standing has a prudential element.262  Within 
relatively recent times, the Court invoked prudential considerations as 
grounds for denying standing in its 2004 decision in Elk Grove Unified 
School District v. Newdow.263  The Court’s majority cited a desire not to 
interfere with family relations structured by state law as a reason to bar a 
father from bringing an action, which the mother of his child opposed, to 
challenge the constitutionality of a school district’s policy of daily 
recitations of the pledge of allegiance.264  Quite likely, the Justices who 
joined the Court’s opinion preferred to avoid deciding the divisive 
Establishment Clause issue that the case presented on the merits.  More 
recently, Justice Kennedy asserted prudential reasons for the Court to 
exercise jurisdiction in United States v. Windsor, in which he thought it 
important for the Court to give clear guidance to the lower courts about the 
constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act.265  But the 
Court rests very few holdings on avowedly prudential grounds, possibly—I 
would speculate—because the Justices find it psychologically and 
rhetorically easier to present themselves as disinterested expositors of the 
law than as personally responsible agents making discretionary decisions.  
Considerations of doctrinal consistency push in the same direction.  As the 
Court recognized in its recent, unanimous decision in Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,266 the invocation of 
prudential grounds for declining to adjudicate “a case or controversy that is 
properly within federal courts’ Article III jurisdiction . . . is in some tension 
with . . . the principle,” which the Court has frequently avowed in other 
contexts, “that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases within 
its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.”267  The important point, however, is 
that formal invocation of explicitly prudential doctrines is one thing, while 
 
261. For a classic argument that the Supreme Court appropriately relies on standing and other 
justiciability doctrines to forestall the need to issue merits rulings, especially in order to reconcile 
the Court’s role as the ultimate guarantor of constitutional “principle” with the sometimes 
competing imperatives of prudence and expediency, see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 115–27 (1962). 
262. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–52 (1984) (“Standing doctrine embraces 
several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction . . . .”); Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975) (“[T]he source of the plaintiff’s claim to relief assumes 
critical importance with respect to the prudential rules of standing that, apart from Art. III’s 
minimum requirements, serve to limit the role of the courts in resolving public disputes.”). 
263. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
264. Id. at 17. 
265. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687–89 (2013). 
266. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
267. Id. at 1386 (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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prudentially driven decision making that eschews such formal reliance may 
be another.  Notwithstanding the Court’s evident unease in Lexmark with 
formal recognition of a prudential element in standing doctrine, grounds for 
suspicion remain that ad hoc pressures to authorize or withhold adjudication 
on the merits may encourage some of the Justices to draw finer distinctions 
than they would draw otherwise—including finer distinctions than they 
might think appropriate in applying other doctrines—in determining 
whether the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability requirements are 
met. 
VI. Prescriptions 
If I am correct that the fragmentation of standing is likely irreversible, 
both the Supreme Court and legal scholars ought to acknowledge this 
reality.  Having done so, they should begin to address the frustration and 
confusion to which unacknowledged or untheorized divisions within the 
doctrine have given rise.  But the Justices, with the aid of scholars whose 
interests include identifying practicable proposals for reform, should 
proceed with awareness of what is likely to be achievable in light of the 
phenomena and jurisprudential commitments—some of which should 
probably be accepted as fixed, at least for the short run—that I discussed in 
Part IV and that have produced fragmentation in the first place. 
A. Judicial Correctives 
Beyond acknowledging that standing doctrine is multifaceted and 
complexly differentiated, the Supreme Court—even if it remains divided 
about many standing matters—should agree on three significant but far 
from revolutionary revisions of its current approach.  None would occasion 
distinctive repudiations of prior positions by any identifiable coterie of 
Justices.  None has an ideological charge. 
First, even if the Court will not go so far as to acknowledge that 
standing issues ultimately involve legal rights and legally valid 
authorizations to sue,268 and even if it continues to insist on the centrality of 
injury in fact, it ought to recognize that what counts as an injury depends on 
the provision under which a plaintiff brings suit.  This modest, clarifying 
recognition would bring increased transparency to divisions about standing.  
 
268. In Lexmark, the Court recharacterized the question whether a plaintiff falls within the 
zone of interests that a statute protects, which it had previously termed one of “prudential 
standing,” as an issue of statutory construction involving whether the plaintiff has a valid cause of 
action.  134 S. Ct. at 1387.  As part of its analysis, the Court noted that it had occasionally referred 
to the zone-of-interests inquiry as one of “statutory standing” but dismissed that label as 
“misleading, since ‘the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not 
implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case.’”  Id. at 1387 & n.4 (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of 
Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002)). 
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Moreover, it should provoke no embarrassment, either to the Court 
institutionally or to any of the Justices individually.  The Court has already 
acknowledged that injury under the Equal Protection Clause depends partly 
on the meaning of the equal protection guarantee.269  It has also recognized 
that some injuries are real, but nevertheless not judicially cognizable, in the 
absence of a statute conferring authority to sue.  For example, in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife,270 Justice Scalia pointed to two prior cases as having 
established that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable 
injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in 
law . . . .”271  From acknowledgment that injuries vary in nature and degree, 
it would be a small step to recognize that, although injury of some sort is 
invariantly required, different constitutional and statutory provisions guard 
against different kinds of injuries, which therefore require contextual 
characterization and appraisal. 
Indeed, in the statutory context, a recognition of this kind arguably 
inheres in the conjunction of Lujan and last Term’s decision in the Lexmark 
case, in which the Justices unanimously characterized the question of 
whether an injured plaintiff came within the zone of interests that a statute 
protected as involving the existence of a legislatively conferred cause of 
action.272  Lujan signals that what counts as a judicially cognizable injury 
can depend on the contents of a statute.  Lexmark confirms that whether 
injuries that would be cognizable in some contexts are actionable in others 
can also turn on the protections and authorizations to sue that particular 
statutes confer.  
Just as the Court should be able to agree that the requirements of injury 
vary with the provisions under which a plaintiff brings suit, it should 
acknowledge that the necessary likelihood of redressability of injury is a 
variable, not a constant.  In response to the examples catalogued in Justice 
Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Clapper, the Court recognized that it has 
articulated different standards in different cases.273  The Court has also, 
separately, pointed out that it applies different rules in cases involving 
procedural injuries than in other kinds of cases.274  With disparities in the 
requisite likelihood of redressability now flushed into the open, one path to 
clarifying reform would of course involve the embrace of a uniform, 
quantitatively formulated standard, specifying a precise likelihood that a 
judicial remedy would redress an injury that otherwise would have 
 
269. See, e.g., Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of 
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (discussing the different meanings of injury in fact in 
different applications of the equal protection clause). 
270. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
271. Id. at 578. 
272. 134 S. Ct. at 1383, 1387. 
273. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013). 
274. E.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. 
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occurred.  An alternative, and I believe more salutary approach, would be 
for the Court to begin to articulate qualitative rather than quantitative 
standards, deeming judicial intervention more important and judicial 
remedies more appropriate in some kinds of cases than in others.  I shall 
return to this issue below.  For now, my principal point is simply that the 
Court, especially after Clapper, should be able to agree that it has advanced 
apparently inconsistent measures of the necessary likelihood that an injury 
would be redressable in order for standing to exist.  Having done so, it 
should take on the agenda of sorting cases into categories and of identifying 
the varying criteria to be applied within them.  I took a provisional stab at 
categorical mapping above.275 
Second, the Court should make explicit that in some contexts, the 
standing requirements that apply to private parties do not extend to the 
government and its officials, and that in other cases the same formally 
articulated demands require adjustments in light of the government’s 
special status and role.  The example that should render this 
acknowledgment relatively uncontroversial and easy for all to swallow is 
governmental standing to enforce the criminal law: no one believes that the 
government must demonstrate a concrete injury to itself in order to 
prosecute a criminal case.276  The government has a variety of kinds of 
interests, some shared with private citizens—such as those in its property 
and in having its contracts enforced—but some not, including those in 
vindicating its sovereign authority over people, places, and subject matters.  
There is no reason to think that rules governing the standing of private 
parties to protect their private interests should apply to all forms of 
government litigation. 
 
275. See supra notes 196–203 and accompanying text. 
276. See Hartnett, supra note 122, at 2246–47 (explaining that the government does not need 
to satisfy ordinary standing requirements in criminal law cases).  According to Professors Ann 
Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson, in the early history of the United States, “criminal prosecutions 
were conducted in the name and under the authority of the people in their collective capacity, and 
the legal rights that they vindicated were understood to be those of the public rather than of any 
private individual.”  Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 6, at 697 (footnote omitted).  
Traditionally, however, a state could not invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction based 
on an injury to one of its citizens in the absence of a distinctive injury to itself of a kind that would 
have grounded standing by a private party.  Id. at 716–17.  This distinction may reflect a further 
set of distinctions among the kinds of interests that a state may seek to assert in litigation, 
including (1) interests in enforcing state civil and criminal law; (2) interests “similar to those of 
private parties,” such as interests in property under contracts; (3) ”parens patriae” or “quasi 
sovereign” interests deriving from those of its citizens; and (4) ”sovereignty interests” in 
vindicating authority over a subject matter.  Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty 
Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209, 213–14 (2014).  In an apparent analogue of the last of 
these kinds of interests, but this time involving the federal government, the Supreme Court 
recently adjudicated an action by the United States to have certain Arizona laws pertaining to 
immigration declared preempted by federal law in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 
(2012). 
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Other requirements may also apply differentially to cases involving the 
government.  The requirement of concrete adversity that Justice Scalia 
thought central in the Windsor case may furnish a case in point.  In a variety 
of cases, the Supreme Court has upheld standing and found the requirement 
of concrete adversity to be satisfied when one official or agency of the 
federal government has sued another official277 or agency.278  Any analogue 
in litigation involving private parties would be unthinkable.  
In asserting that the rules governing standing by private litigants may 
not apply to the government, or that the same verbal formula may produce 
different results, I will not venture further into specifics.  Particular rules or 
proposed modifications might understandably provoke controversy.  In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, the question of whether particular rules 
should apply differently to a state government in a particular kind of suit 
divided the Supreme Court by 5–4.279  Without seeking to resolve under-
standable disputes, I suggest only that the nature of the remaining debates 
would be clearer if the Court dropped the pretense that Article III invariably 
applies to government litigants in the same way as to private parties. 
Third, and relatedly, though admittedly more controversially, the 
Justices should recognize that disputed standing questions are frequently 
enmeshed with concerns about the propriety of particular kinds of 
remedies.280  Standing issues rarely emerge in suits for damages.281  By 
contrast, justiciability disputes occur with considerable frequency in suits 
for injunctive or declaratory relief.  In actions for equitable remedies, the 
Court has occasionally said that the concerns bearing on standing merge 
along a spectrum with concerns about whether the relief sought would 
overreach the bounds of judicial competence or enmesh the issuing court in 
 
277. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974). 
278. See United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 337 U.S. 426, 431–32 (1949) 
(finding standing in a suit by the United States as shipper to set aside a reparations order entered 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission).  See generally Michael Herz, United States v. United 
States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991) 
(discussing how the Supreme Court has allowed federal government officials or agencies to sue 
another official or agency and has never dismissed a case by characterizing it as the government 
suing itself). 
279. 549 U.S. 497, 501, 518–20 (2007). 
280. For an earlier and fuller development of this theme, see generally Fallon, supra note 201. 
281. Id. at 650.  Exceptions involve the antitrust laws and class action cases.  In antitrust 
cases, the Supreme Court has attempted to restrict plaintiffs from seeking treble damages under 
the Sherman Antitrust Act for literal violations of the Act that cause injuries unrelated to 
anticompetitive behavior.  Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 484–89 
(1977); see also RUDOLPH CALLMAN, 1 CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK & 
MONOPOLY § 4:49 (4th ed. 2013) (observing that “[a]ntitrust standing is distinct from 
constitutional standing, in which a mere showing of harm in fact will establish the necessary 
injury,” and depends on further considerations involving proper parties to enforce the antitrust 
laws).  In class action cases, lower courts have split over the question of whether all prospective 
members of a class must be injured, or if an injury to the named class members is sufficient for 
standing purposes.  In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 800–02 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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functions more properly reserved to democratically accountable institu-
tions.282   
The connection that the Supreme Court has noted in these cases 
deserves more general recognition.  Whether self-consciously or not, and 
whether wisely and consistently or not, cases that state and apply different 
standards for the likelihood of redressability that is needed for standing 
almost certainly reflect sensitivity to the propriety of the award of particular 
remedies under particular circumstances.  Clapper signaled as much when it 
cited authority purporting to establish that standing should be particularly 
difficult to establish when plaintiffs seek to challenge national security 
policies.283   
A telling analogy in this respect emerges from a comparison between 
two cases from the 1970s in which plaintiffs sought relief based on alleged 
misconduct by the Ohio National Guard.  In one, the Court allowed a suit 
for damages to go forward.284  In the other, Gilligan v. Morgan,285 it 
dismissed a suit for injunctive relief on the ground that it presented a 
nonjusticiable political question.286  With both cases growing out of the 
same set of events, the principal difference that led the Court to pronounce 
one justiciable and the other not involved the nature of the relief that the 
respective plaintiffs requested.  In my judgment, there should be little doubt 
that the anxieties about judicial competence that motivated Gilligan—
involving a demand for a judicially mandated restructuring of the Ohio 
National Guard287—closely parallel the concerns that frequently underlie 
rulings that plaintiffs who seek injunctive remedies against sensitive 
governmental operations have no standing. 
As I have stated before, it would be better if the demands for standing 
were relaxed and disputes about the propriety of equitable relief were 
openly debated and resolved within the law of remedies.288  Traditional 
standards for the award of equitable remedies call for a balancing of public 
and private interests.289  Looking at variations in the Court’s articulation 
 
282. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013) (stating that 
the law of standing is “built on separation-of-powers principles” and prevents the judicial branch 
from “usurp[ing] the power of the political branches”); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 
(1974) (considerations bearing on standing “obviously shade into those determining whether the 
complaint states a sound basis for equitable relief” and emphasize the importance of judicial 
restraint when “state officers [are] engaged in the administration of the State’s criminal laws”). 
283. 133 S. Ct. at 1147. 
284. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 233–35 (1974). 
285. 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
286. Id. at 3, 11–12. 
287. Id. at 3–4. 
288. See Fallon, supra note 203, at 704–05. 
289. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (reciting a four-
factor test for the award of permanent injunctions that includes considering the public interest); 
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312–13 (1982) (emphasizing that “courts of equity 
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and application of redressability standards that make standing distinctively 
easier to obtain in some kinds of actions than in others,290 I find it difficult 
to believe that such a balancing is not being conducted, even though the 
Court refuses to acknowledge as much.  And if what once was called a 
balancing of public and private interests occurs anyway, it would dispel 
confusion and enhance clarity of analysis for the Court to frame debates 
about the propriety of remedies in terms that bring all pertinent 
considerations clearly into view. 
Others may of course disagree, perhaps based on a concern that for 
courts to rest their decisions in suits for injunctive relief on judgments about 
competing public and private interests would cast the judiciary in a policy-
making role and undermine public respect for the courts as nonpartisan 
oracles of a determinate body of previously established law.  In my 
judgment, aspirations to conceal the nature of and grounds for official 
decisions fit uneasily with the premises of liberal democracy.291  And 
among the institutions of liberal democracy, courts have special obligations 
of candor.292  Nonetheless, I do not mean to be dogmatic in suggesting that 
standing rules applicable to probabilistic injuries and their redressability 
should be relaxed and analysis of the propriety of equitable relief 
correspondingly revitalized.  Even if the Court resisted that relatively bold 
suggestion, it would enhance clarity within the domain of standing law for 
the Court to acknowledge more consistently that the standing question is 
one about the justiciability of disputes and that justiciability depends partly 
on the nature of the remedy that a plaintiff seeks.  If progress is ever to be 
made in making sense of the varied standards that the Court has invoked in 
gauging the likelihood of future injury and the probability of successful 
redress that are necessary to support standing, that progress will depend on 
a recognition that the Court’s pattern of decisions reflects a sensitivity to 
the nature of the relief for which a plaintiff asks.  Having acknowledged 
that pattern, the Court should address the questions to which it gives rise. 
B. A Role for Legal Scholarship 
In my view, there are many forms of valuable scholarship.  It implies 
no disparagement of any to say that, given the current confusion about 
standing, both the bench and the bar, as well as law students, would profit 
from more work by law professors that examined standing doctrine from 
 
should pay particular regard . . . [to] public consequences” when considering the remedy of an 
injunction); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) (weighing both private and 
public interests in deciding whether forum non conveniens is appropriate). 
290. See supra subpart II(A). 
291. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 (1971) (discussing the “publicity 
condition” of liberal society). 
292. See generally David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 
(1987) (defending the view that judges have an obligation of candor and explicating its content). 
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what I characterized above as a doctrinal Realist perspective.  In the most 
general terms, doctrinal Realism assumes that although judicial articulations 
of applicable rules frequently furnish reliable indicators of future judicial 
decisions, context matters crucially to determinations of whether and how 
abstract legal concepts apply.293  To make either good predictions or sound 
judicial decisions requires “situation sense,”294 which in turn can depend on 
discriminating insights concerning what is, and what others will perceive as 
being, reasonable and appropriate under varied circumstances.295 
Through much of this Article, and especially in Part II, I have pursued 
a doctrinal Realist approach, with the goal not only of generating specific 
insights into the current structure of standing doctrine, but also of 
illustrating a style of analysis that others might usefully practice.  In 
characterizing myself as having deployed doctrinal Realist assumptions, I 
make no claim of innovation.  I am not even the first to deploy a doctrinal 
Realist methodology to standing doctrine.  Among those who have most 
notably done so is Judge William Fletcher in his article The Structure of 
Standing,296 which has both shaped my general thinking about standing and 
inspired some of the specific analysis in this Article.  Judge Fletcher made 
it patently clear that the Supreme Court’s standing determinations vary with 
the constitutional or statutory provision under which plaintiffs bring suit.  I 
have previously emphasized the pertinence of concerns about appropriate 
remedies to standing analysis.297  But there is plainly opportunity for much 
more doctrinal Realist work, perhaps most urgently with regard to the 
currently vexed topic of probabilistic standing.298  More imaginative 
 
293. See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 282 (discussing the need to consider context to understand 
certain controversial standing opinions); Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate 
and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1215 (2006) (noting that Realists argued for 
“greater sensitivity to commercial, political, and social context”). 
294. Cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 60 
(1960) (“Situation-sense will serve well enough to indicate the type-facts in their context and at 
the same time in their pressure for a satisfying working result, coupled with whatever the judge or 
court brings and adds to the evidence, in the way of knowledge and experience and values to see 
with, and to judge with.”). 
295. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 3, at 281–84 (dividing standing cases into statutory and 
constitutional categories and arguing, among other things, that taxpayer standing cases should be 
understood based on the constitutional provision at issue rather than the status of the petitioner); 
Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 42, at 1240 (“A further line of attack on the 
apparent conflict and uncertainty among the decisions in appellate courts has been to seek a more 
understandable statement of them by grouping the facts in new—and typically but not always 
narrower—categories.”); Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A Functional 
Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 646–47 (1973) (arguing the importance of “distinguish[ing] the 
different contexts in which an issue of standing is said to arise” in order to “give coherence to the 
much-criticized doctrine”). 
296. Fletcher, supra note 43. 
297. See supra notes 284–90 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra subpart II(D). 
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analysis will generate new hypotheses.299  Modern research tools will abet 
better empirical examination of larger data sets. 
 
299. Professor Richard Re argues interestingly that the Supreme Court’s standing cases are 
best understood as displaying an immanent pattern of upholding standing by “those claimants with 
the greatest stake in obtaining legal relief in any particular case” and of denying standing to those 
with lesser stakes based on an implicit recognition that resolving their claims is not “necessary to 
remedy a violation of law.”  Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1197 (2014).  
Although I am much in sympathy with the spirit of Professor Re’s inquiry, and admire the 
imagination with which he pursues it, in my view he offers no adequate explanation of what it 
means for a litigant to have or not to have “the greatest stake in obtaining relief in any particular 
case.”  In some cases, the question appears to turn on a relatively straightforward inquiry 
involving the rights that a particular constitutional or statutory provision confers.  Affirmative 
action cases furnish a good example.  Whether an excluded white applicant with a better academic 
record has a greater stake in obtaining relief in the form of a judicial invalidation of a challenged 
admissions policy than an excluded applicant with a weaker academic record apparently depends 
on the proper definition of the relevant right (if any) that the Equal Protection Clause confers: if 
there is a right not to have race considered in the review of one’s application, then the two 
candidates have an equal stake.  If the purported right is a right not to be denied a place on the 
basis of race-based considerations, then the candidate with the stronger claim to be admitted under 
race-neutral criteria would apparently have a greater stake in obtaining legal relief.  What I find 
most telling, however, is that postulation that only the “claimants with the greatest stake in 
obtaining legal relief” should have standing affords no help in resolving the question on which 
standing ultimately turns, which involves the scope of the rights that the Equal Protection Clause 
protects.  On the surface, relational issues may look more pertinent in cases in which a central 
question involves uncertain or possible future action that might violate one or another party’s 
rights.  The Clapper case, which I discussed earlier, supra notes 97–109, 187–93 and 
accompanying text, and which Professor Re also discusses to illustrate his theory, Re, supra, at 
1244–47, exemplifies this kind of case.  In Clapper, he emphasizes, the Court appeared to think it 
relevant that there might be another party who would have suffered a more indisputable injury 
than the actual plaintiffs and who would thus be a more appropriate claimant of standing.  Id. at 
1246.  But I am unpersuaded that relational considerations—involving whether other plaintiffs 
would have more palpable or likely injuries—door ought to do the work that Professor Re thinks 
they do.  Suppose that, although the Court could not be certain at the outset, the Clapper plaintiffs 
were in fact being subjected to unconstitutional searches or seizures.  On this supposition, it seems 
mysterious to me why they would have a lesser stake in having the violation of their rights 
enjoined than would other possible plaintiffs.  Professor Re’s implicit assumption may be that 
when one party can establish only a probabilistic injury, and another party has suffered a 
demonstrably realized injury, the former always has a lesser stake than the latter.  But from the 
perspective of one party, another party’s rights and injuries will often be virtual irrelevancies.  
Suppose that the parties held out as potentially better plaintiffs in Clapper later choose not to sue 
for an injunction, accept a plea bargain without litigating their constitutional claim in the context 
of a criminal prosecution, or bring and settle a suit for damages.  As a normative matter, I see no 
reason why the latter’s conduct should bear on whether the former’s stake in procuring relief 
should suffice to confer standing.  Noting considerations such as these, Professor Re says that the 
problem in Clapper was more “nuanced” than the Court acknowledged, see id. at 1246, and he 
concludes that “[a] more defensible relativistic analysis would have erred on the side of affording 
standing.”  Id. at 1247.  The deeper problem, in my view, is that a “relativistic analysis” would, 
more often than not, require “err[ing]” one way or the other without furnishing adequate criteria 
for defining error.  As a descriptive and doctrinal matter, moreover, the Court has explicitly 
rejected Professor Re’s position in cases in which plaintiffs seek injunctive relief by holding that 
realized injuries that will indisputably ground standing to sue for damages can fail to establish the 
likelihood of future injury necessary to standing to sue for injunctive relief.  See Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02, 109, 111–13 (1983) (denying respondent’s standing for injunctive 
relief but acknowledging that he “still has a claim for damages against the City that appears to 
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In suggesting that doctrinal Realist scholarship could help bring order 
to a body of law that many experience as subsisting in confusion—largely 
by identifying categories of cases in which the Supreme Court’s general 
statements of doctrinal requirements have differing applications—I have 
called attention to the value of pattern making in predicting the outcome of 
future cases.  But scholarship that begins with doctrinal Realist assumptions 
can also very usefully extend into the normative realm. 
Although persuasively identified patterns of judicial decisions can 
command recognition as part of the fabric of the law, pattern identification 
is by no means necessarily a value-free exercise.  As Ronald Dworkin 
persuasively argued, legal theories defining what the law is and prescribing 
how judges should decide future hard cases are appropriately tested against 
the sometimes competing criteria of fit and normative attractiveness.300  
When both are taken into account, imaginative groupings of cases, and 
equally imaginative imputations to them of immanent moral and policy-
based rationales, can sometimes be justified.  
Doctrinal Realist theorizing of this kind can frequently involve law 
professors in seeking to improve existing law, albeit typically 
incrementally, by depicting the patterns of cases that they have identified as 
already reflecting attractive values that judges should strive to realize more 
fully in the future.301  In my view, some patterns of standing cases plainly 
lend themselves to explanation as embodying attractive principles.  For 
example, I applaud standing cases under the Equal Protection Clause that 
hold, in effect, that being subjected to unequal treatment in the distribution 
of benefits or opportunities constitutes an adequate inquiry to support 
standing, even absent a further showing of material harm.  In my judgment, 
this conclusion flows from the substantive purposes best ascribed to the 
Equal Protection Clause.  If I am correct that the Court frequently upholds 
standing to sue to enjoin the enforcement of criminal statutes without 
stringent demands of proof that prosecutors would actually enforce a 
challenged statute against a particular plaintiff—as I hypothesized  
 
 
 
meet all Art. III requirements”).  Professor Re thinks Lyons was ultimately wrongly decided 
because no alternative plaintiff had a greater stake, Re, supra, at 1241–42, but this stance requires 
an implicit judgment of the stake that is minimally adequate to support standing, contrary to 
Professor Re’s stated position that noncomparative inquiries into the adequacy of a stake to 
ground standing are unworkable.  Id. at 1204, 1209–12. 
300. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255–58 (1986) (describing the process by which 
judges resolve hard cases in light of interlocking and sometimes competing considerations of fit 
and political morality). 
301. Dworkin would himself falsify any rigid claim that a practitioner of the Dworkinian 
method can be only modestly innovative; I offer the claim in text as a generalization, not a 
categorical rule. 
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above302—that pattern also strikes me as a normatively desirable one that 
good interpretive theorizing could usefully identify and rationalize.  
Citizens who believe that they have a constitutional right to engage in a 
course of conduct that they otherwise would engage in should not need to 
risk a criminal prosecution with an uncertain outcome in order to do so.  
But these are only examples.  My point, once again, is that there is valuable 
work to be done—not that patterns are obvious or that self-evident legal 
principles explain why patterns that appear attractive on the surface ought 
to be continued.  
I should emphasize, moreover, that doctrinal Realism should not 
disable criticism.  For example, imaginatively identified patterns of cases 
might reveal disturbing biases or insensitivities among Justices and judges, 
possibly embedded in culturally influenced factual judgments.  To repeat an 
example that I offered earlier, some writers have argued that the Supreme 
Court has recurrently disfavored claims of injury by racial minority 
groups.303  If so, good doctrinal Realist scholarship might help to trigger 
reform by exposing concealed biases.  That said, I would expect the most 
telling insights to be discriminating ones, not global generalizations 
about—for example—the irreducibly political character of determinations 
of standing across the entire gamut of cases. 
Conclusion 
Recent years have witnessed a continuing and possibly accelerated 
fragmentation of standing doctrine.  For reasons that I have canvassed, one 
need not like this trend in order to predict that the future will hold more of 
the same.  Absent dramatic changes in the doctrine’s structure, the Supreme 
Court’s composition, or both, standing’s fragmentation seems over-
determined. 
If so, it is time for judges and Justices, law professors and law students 
to come to terms with standing’s fragmentation by acknowledging and, 
within limits, embracing it.  In the domain of standing law, we should 
recognize simplicity and elegance as illusions.  We should distrust the large 
generalizations that have often occupied center stage in judicial opinions. 
 
 
 
302. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
303. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (2013) (“Today, courts reviewing equal protection challenges to facially 
neutral laws brought by members of minority groups proceed under law that directs judges to 
defer to representative government, while courts reviewing equal protection claims brought by 
members of majority groups strictly scrutinize challenges to affirmative action.”); Spann, supra 
note 231, at 1422–25 (“The observation that I wish to offer is that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Northeastern Florida . . . is one of a series of racially suspicious decisions that the Supreme Court 
has issued concerning the issue of standing.”); supra notes 228–31 and accompanying text. 
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But we should not throw up our hands or succumb to legal nihilism.  
Patterns exist, even if the lines that demarcate them are sometimes difficult 
to identify, as well as more numerous and complex than we might wish.  
The doctrinal Realist credo affords a note of hope, not despair: We need to 
discern the “tangibles which can be got at beneath the words.”304  
 
 
 
304. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 42, at 1223. 
